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






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
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
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


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Letters



Jacked Up

I enjoyed the article "Escape From New York" [by Norman Goldstein, November], but the British naval vessels in the artwork [on P. 27] depicting the landing of British forces are flying the wrong ensign. In 1776 the flag consisted of only the red cross of England superimposed on the white diagonal cross (saltire) of Scotland. The diagonal red cross of St. Patrick (now a familiar part of the British flag) was not added until after the union with Ireland in 1801. If you look very carefully at the painting of Richard Howe [on P. 32], you will see a depiction of the correct flag.

Thank you for producing a very interesting magazine.

Martyn Whittock
BATH, UNITED KINGDOM

Editor responds: The British banners depicted in the 19th-century wood engraving on P. 27 are indeed anachronistic, not coming into use until 1801, as you point out. But the artist also erred in that he rendered the full field Union Jack and not the Red Ensign depicted in the portrait of Howe and illus-

trated above. Royal Navy ships of the era flew the Red Ensign, White Ensign or Blue Ensign to designate their squadron. Ships at anchor were permitted to fly a smaller Union Jack, but only at the bow. The practice must have proven confusing, as in 1864 the Admiralty designated the white as the official banner for British warships, the red for merchantmen and the blue for reserve vessels. Thank you for the learning opportunity.

Samuel Smith

It would seem you missed a big opportunity in an illustration caption in "Escape From New York," by Norman Goldstein, about the August 1776 Battle of Brooklyn Heights (aka the Battle of Long Island). I refer to the caption that reads, "Captain Samuel Smith (who later served his state as a U.S. senator) leads the surviving Marylanders to safety across Gowanus Creek." Goldstein is correct to commemorate the heroism of the "Maryland Line" for protecting the rear of Washington's army, at great loss to them-

selves, and thus ensuring the American commander and his men fought another day. But Smith was much more than a U.S. senator for Maryland. As major general of the Maryland militia, Smith was commander of the defense of Baltimore on Sept. 12–14, 1814, that ensured "our flag was still there." One more thing: That Smith would have worn a frock coat like a rifleman in August 1776, as indicated by this artwork, is extremely doubtful. Smith was an infantry officer, not a rifleman.

Christopher T. George Baltimore, Md.

Editor responds: Oh, that we had room in our captions for more information. That said, Smith's role in the defense of Baltimore is a subject for another complete feature. Regarding his attire: You'll have to take that up with the artist, Don Troiani. (Note: Mr. George is the co-author with John McCavitt of The Man Who Captured Washington: Major General Robert Ross and the War of 1812, reviewed in the January 2017 issue.)

Shooting Year

[Re. Liesl Bradner's November 2016 article "The Battle That Never Was":] The letter in your January issue from Wayne Long about the respective "shooting year" of American and Japanese submarines in 1942 was true but not entirely accurate. While the Japanese did inflict far more devastating losses on American combat vessels than our submarines did on Japa-

nese combat ships that year, he left out a crucial detail: American submarines were ordered to concentrate on cargo vessels and troopships and to ignore combat vessels except when necessary. Navy brass had decided the best way to achieve victory was to cut off the flow of supplies and men to Japanese bases in the Pacific. The campaign was highly successful. In fact, most Japanese destroyers sunk by American submarines were transporting supplies and personnel. This has been well documented by a number of sources.

The Japanese, unlike the Germans, attacked very few Allied cargo and troopships by comparison. Whether this was due to a misguided war strategy or part of the samurai code, I have no idea. In any event, most modern naval historians consider it one of Japan's biggest blunders of World War II. I intend no disrespect to American or Japanese submariners. My father served in the Pacific with the U.S. Navy and fought in combat from Midway to Okinawa. He had the greatest respect for the Japanese and applied for submarine duty. Instead, he wound up on the battleship USS Iowa. He never regretted the assignment.

Patrick B. Miano PHOENIX, ARIZ.

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RELIEF STREETBy Brendan Manley



RESEARCHERS SEEK TO ID MEXICAN WAR REMAINS

The U.S. Army [army.mil] has repatriated the comingled skeletal remains of at least 11 and perhaps as many as 13 American soldiers killed at the Battle of Monterrey during the 1846–48 Mexican War. Last fall the Army flew the remains to Delaware's Dover Air Force Base [dover.af.mil], where researchers from the Armed Forces Medical Examiner System and Middle Tennessee State University will seek to determine the exact number and perhaps identities of the combatants.

The Sept. 21–24, 1846, battle pitted Brevet Maj. Gen. Zachary Taylor's 6,200-man Army of Occupation against General Pedro de Ampudia's 7,300-strong Army of the North. After bitter fighting that brought the Americans within blocks of the central plaza, Ampudia handed over Monterrey in exchange for a two-month armistice. Taylor took heat from

President James K. Polk for negotiating, but the victory opened the door to central Mexico.

More than 160 Americans died or went missing during the clash. Though identification of the remains will be difficult, researchers suspect they may belong to men from Colonel William B. Campbell's 1st Regiment, Tennessee Volunteers, dubbed the "Bloody First" for its 14 percent casualty rate at Monterrey. According to period accounts the Tennesseans were "cut up horribly" and "buried in every direction." The bones turned up in 2011 in a sector of the battlefield where they fought. To sort out individuals, the team will employ DNA analysis, forensic dentistry and other methods. Skeletal analysis may narrow down where each hails from, but the researchers would need DNA samples from living relatives in order to put names to the remains.

'The wind of passing balls and bombs continually fanned their faces'

—War correspondent Thomas Bangs Thorpe, on the Battle of Monterrey

WWII Museum Grows Up and Out



The National WWII Museum in New Orleans [nationalww2 museum.org] is in the midst of a \$370 million expansion, with eight projects under construction and another 16 in planning and design stages. Forthcoming facilities include a \$66 million hotel and 450-space parking garage; the three-story Hall of Democracy, which will host outreach programs and exhibits; and the Canopy of Peace, a 150-foot-tall architectural span designed to unify the campus under the theme "We're All in This Together."

Robots to Destroy Chemical Weapons

The U.S. Army Chemical Materials Activity [cma.army.mil] is employing robots to destroy stockpiles of mustard gas at its Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado, starting with 780,000 chemical-filled artillery shells. In compliance with the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention [cwc.gov] the robots will dis-



mantle up to 500 shells per day, which the largely automated plant will then neutralize with water and bacteria.

World's Oldest Carrier Retires

In early 2017 the Indian Navy [indiannavy.nic.in] will decommission 57-year-old *Viraat*, the world's oldest serving aircraft carrier. Commissioned in 1959 as the Royal Navy carrier *Hermes*, the 738-foot *Centaur*-class flattop served as the British flagship during the 1982 Falklands War. Initially retired in 1984, it was purchased



by India, refitted and recommissioned in 1987. India is working on its own *Vikrant* class of carriers, the second ship of which will be nuclear-powered.

U.S. Army Tests 'Super Bazooka'

Weapon researchers at the U.S. Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground [apg.army.mil] in Maryland are testing the M3E1 "super bazooka"—the latest iteration of the 84 mm Carl Gustaf recoilless rifle, introduced in 1948.



Designed by Swedish aerospace and defense giant Saab, the weapon is optimized for urban warfare, with a lighter, more ergonomic design than the current M3 and an intelligent sight interface that enables users to detonate rounds above a precise point.

OHIO BUILDS NATIONAL VETERANS MUSEUM



Ohio's Columbus Downtown Development Corp. is overseeing construction of the National Veterans Memorial and Museum [nationalvmm.org], even as Congress mulls legislation to make it official. Projected to open in the summer of 2018, the \$75 million facility on the Scioto River will feature glass curtain walls and a gleaming white spiral processional leading to a rooftop sanctuary. The 50,000-square-foot museum will include interactive displays, artifacts, oral histories and letters, filmed interviews with veterans and a time line of historic military events and figures. A remembrance room will honor those killed in action, while an outdoor memorial grove on 7 acres offers a place to reflect on veterans' sacrifices.

LEE'S RESTORED HO REOPENS IN GETTYSBURG

The Civil War Trust [civilwar.org] has reopened the newly restored 1832 house on Seminary Ridge in Gettysburg, Pa., that Confederate General Robert E. Lee used as his headquarters during the July 1–3, 1863,



Battle of Gettysburg. The trust spent \$6 million to buy 69-year-old widow Mary Thompson's wartime home, which until recently shared its 4-acre property with a 48-room motel. Work crews have since demolished the motel and its facilities and restored much of the property to its period appearance. The trust plans ultimately to donate the site to the National Park Service for incorporation into the adjacent Gettysburg National Military Park [nps.gov/gett].

WAR RECORD

Feb. 5, 1980

Iranian captors at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran wake their **hostages** (see P. 18), blindfold them and order them at gunpoint to strip and kneel. In a cruel episode of psychological torture, the guards cock their guns but do not fire, then eject the rounds.

Feb. 18, 1519

Lacking a formal commission, **Hernán Cortés** (see P. 30) commits open mutiny by sailing for Mexico with a fleet of 11 ships, 663 men, 16 horses and a small number of cannon. Within three years he conquers the Aztec empire for Spain.

Feb. 28, 1991

President George H.W. Bush ends Operation Desert Storm by declaring a cease-fire in Iraq and announcing the liberation of Kuwait. The victory comes six weeks after initiation of the air campaign with **Operation Eager Anvil** (see P. 38) on January 17.

March 19, 1964


Combat photojournalist **Horst Faas** (see P. 56) photographs a father holding the body of his child as South Vietnamese Army Rangers look down from their armored vehicle. The picture garners Faas the first of two Pulitzer Prizes.

March 406 BC

Athens elects a new eightmember board of generals. Their tenure is brief. Having failed to rescue survivors in the wake of Athens' victory over Sparta at the naval **Battle of Arginusae** (see P. 62), six generals are tried and executed.

OCKWISE FROM TOP LEFT; UNIVERSITY OF WEST FLORIDA: TRIMONTIUM TRUST; WIKIMEDIA COMMO

News



FIRST SHIP BUILT IN NORTH AMERICA?

Archaeologists with the University of West Florida [uwf.edu] have pinpointed the third of six sunken Spanish ships from Tristán de Luna's 1559 expedition to Pensacola, where the conquistador founded the earliest known European settlement in North America. Discovered in shallow water close to shore, the vessel may be the bark *La Salvadora*, one of the first ships actually built in the New World.

Sailing from Veracruz, Mexico, Luna's 11-ship fleet arrived in Pensacola Bay on Aug. 14, 1559, carrying 1,500 soldiers and settlers, including Aztec warriors and farmers. The colony they founded came six years before St. Augustine, Fla. (North America's oldest continually occupied European-established settlement), and nearly 50 years before the English founded Jamestown, Va. Five weeks after their arrival a hurricane struck the Gulf

Coast, sinking six of Luna's vessels and most of the colony's supplies. The settlers endured for two years before abandoning Pensacola.

The Florida Bureau of Archaeological Research discovered the first of Luna's shipwrecks in 1992, while UWF divers found the second in 2006. Last summer, after detecting nearshore anomalies with a magnetometer, UWF divers probed the sand and unearthed telltale artifacts, including ceramics, ballast stones and hull planking. La Salvadora was the only one of Luna's ships constructed in the New World, so researchers will analyze the surviving planking to determine the origin of its wood. Meanwhile, the UWF team will continue to pore over the site and follow up on other magnetic anomalies in hopes of finding the remaining three undiscovered Luna wrecks.

'Seamen say that it is the best port in the Indies'

—Tristán de Luna to King Philip II, regarding Pensacola Bay

Scottish Fort Yields Roman Sling Bullets



Archaeologists with the Scottish historical society Trimontium Trust [trimontium.org.uk] have excavated more than 800 Roman lead sling bullets—the largest such cache ever found—at Burnswark Hill, a 2nd-century hilltop fort in Dumfriesshire. Based on the projectiles and other finds experts believe an assault force of some 5,000 Romans used the hail of bullets as a "shock and awe" tactic against the 1,000—2,000 hilltop defenders, possibly at the outset of a lowland invasion.

Family Sues Met Over WWII Picasso



The greatgrandniece of Jewish German industrialist Paul Leffmann recently sued New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art [met museum.org] for return of

the circa 1904–05 Pablo Picasso oil *The Actor*, which Leffmann sold under duress in 1938. After fleeing Germany for fascist Italy, Leffmann reportedly sold the painting for \$12,000 to pay for passage to neutral Switzerland. The Met, which received the painting as a donation in 1952, intends to keep the work.

Kyushu Tomb Held Singular Swords

Researchers with Japan's Gangoji Institute for Research of Cultural Property [www.gangoji.or.jp/ken kyusho/eng/top.htm] have confirmed that two swords found in



recent years in a 6th-century tomb on Kyushu represent the longest known ancient Japanese sword—nearly 60 inches when intact—and the oldest known East Asian sword to bear ray skin as ornamentation. The weapons likely belonged to a high-ranking official in the Yamato kingdom.

WWI U-Boat Wreck Sunk by 'Monster'

Scottish Power engineers surveying the seabed off Galloway have turned up sonar images of a World War I German submarine, believed to be *UB-85*, which sank off the coast in 1918. That April 30 the Royal Navy Q-ship *Coreopsis* surprised *UB-85* on the surface, prompting its surrender. According to popular lore the sub captain, who scuttled *UB-85* before abandoning ship, later claimed a sea monster had damaged the U-boat.



NEW B-21 STEALTH NAMED FOR RAIDERS



The U.S. Air Force [af.mil] has named its forthcoming Northrop Grumman B-21 stealth bomber the Raider, in honor of the World War II Doolittle Raiders, the airmen who on April 18, 1942, mounted the first aerial strike of the war against Japan's Home Islands. Lt. Col. Jimmy Doolittle led 16 B-25B Mitchells in the daring raid, launched from the aircraft carrier USS *Hornet*. Lt. Col. Richard E. "Dick" Cole, 101, the last surviving Raider, formally announced the new stealth moniker. Each B-21 of the \$80 billion, 100-plane contract will cost upward of \$550 million.

EISENHOWER FAMILY APPROVES MEMORIAL



The family of Dwight D. Eisenhower, World War II supreme Allied commander and 34th U.S. president, has dropped its opposition to the memorial [eisenhowermemorial.org] in his honor in Washington, D.C., following tweaks by architect Frank Gehry. Seven years in design, the \$150 million project on 4 acres near Capitol Hill has endured criticism from the family, Congress and other stakeholders. The most controversial aspect has been a 447-foot-long, 80-foot-high steel mesh tapestry (dubbed the "Iron Curtain" by critics) evoking themes from Eisenhower's life. The approved version will depict the Kansas plains of his boyhood, as well as his wartime headquarters in England.

TICKET TO WAR

War is a sadly inexhaustible subject for filmmakers. While Hacksaw Ridge—the true story of World War II conscientious objector and Medal of Honor recipient Desmond Doss—has come and gone, the following are just out or soon to screen:

The Unknowns

Filmed by two veterans of the 3rd U.S. Infantry (aka "The Old Guard")— the regiment that provides sentinels for the Tomb of the Unknowns in Arlington National Cemetery—this documentary [theunknowns movie.com] reveals the unit's rigorous training program.

Another Mother's Son

The World War II story of widow Louisa Gould, from the German-occupied British Crown dependency of Jersey, who was sent to a concentration camp and later gassed for having hidden escaped Russian prisoner Feodor Buryi in her house.

Never Surrender: The Ed Ramsey Story

A documentary about Edwin R. Ramsey, who on Jan. 16, 1942, as a U.S. Army lieutenant in the Philippines, led his 26th Cavalry troopers on the last cavalry charge in U.S. history, driving off a body of Japanese infantry supported by tanks.

Memories of a Forgotten War

Relating the successful British-Indian repulse of the 1944 Japanese invasion of India, this documentary combines oral history and archival footage, with witness and combatant accounts from both sides.

NEW YORK DIVISION OF MILITARY AND NAVALAFFARS (2)

Valor Heroic Hellfighter

By Chuck Lyons



Henry Johnson U.S. Army Medal of Honor May 15, 1918

n his 1928 book *Rank and File* Theodore Roosevelt Jr., American Legion co-founder and son of the former president, rated Henry Johnson one of the five bravest U.S. soldiers in World War I. But not until June 2, 2015, did Johnson receive proper recognition from his country, when President Barack Obama posthumously awarded him the Medal of Honor.

Born just before the turn of the 20th century in Winston-Salem, N.C., Johnson was working as a train porter in Albany. N.Y., in 1917 when he enlisted in the Army. He was assigned to Company C, 15th New York National Guard Regiment, an all-black unit soon redesignated the 369th Infantry. At a time when black soldiers were generally confined to manual labor, the men of the 369th (aka "Harlem Hellfighters") were lent to the hard-strapped French Fourth Army. Wearing French helmets and

carrying French weapons, they entered combat near Sainte-Menehould, France.

There in the predawn darkness of May 15, 1918, Johnson and fellow "Hellfighter" Needham Roberts were on sentry duty when they came under German sniper fire. Anticipating an attack, the privates readied a box of 30

hand grenades for quick use. Johnson soon heard the wire near his position being cut and hurled a grenade. He then told Roberts to inform the French commander what was happening. Roberts set out, but as enemy rifle fire picked up, he turned back to the dugout to help Johnson. He made it back, but not be-

fore being badly wounded in the arm by shrapnel. Too injured to use a rifle, he instead handed grenades to Johnson, who hurled them at the enemy.

By the time the pair used up their grenades, Johnson too had been wounded, struck in the head by bullets. Regardless, he kept firing his rifle, absorbing more enemy rounds in his side and hand, until his French rifle jammed. As the Germans overran his position, Johnson swung his jammed rifle like a club until the stock shattered. At that moment the young American took a blow to the head and went down. As two Germans sought to drag away Roberts (standard practice for intelligence purposes), Johnson pulled his sole remaining weapon, a machete-like bolo knife, leaped to his feet and charged back into the fray.

"Each slash meant something, believe me," Johnson later said.

He cut down two of the enemy with his bolo knife, took a bullet to the arm, stabbed another German who had come up behind him and then dragged Roberts away from his captors. Only when the surviving enemy soldiers took to their heels did Johnson finally collapse. French reinforcements arrived to find him unconscious.

Johnson arrived at a field hospital with 21 injuries, including bullet and stab wounds to his head, torso, right arm and left leg, and his left foot had been shattered. Observers later deter-

mined he had repulsed a German raiding party, killing four of the enemy and wounding upward of a dozen more.

"There wasn't anything so fine about it," the self-effacing private recalled. "Just fought for my life. A rabbit would have done that."

Nicknamed "Black Death" by his comrades, Johnson re-

ceived the *Croix de guerre*, France's highest military honor, with a bronze palm and star. But U.S. awards were lacking until President Bill Clinton posthumously awarded him the Purple Heart in 1996, and Congress granted him the Distinguished Service Cross in 2002.

Johnson died in his 30s in 1929 in Washington, D.C., and is interred at Arlington National Cemetery. **MH**

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What We Learned From...

The Fall of Singapore, 1942

By James Byrne



he supposedly impregnable British bastion of Singapore fell to the Japanese on Feb. 15, 1942, after the latter marched down the Malay Peninsula and executed an amphibious crossing of the Johore Strait. Commonwealth losses during the 69-day campaign exceeded 130,000 killed, wounded or captured, while the Japanese lost fewer than 10,000 casualties. Remarkably, the Japanese captured the "Gibraltar of the East" with a force that barely exceeded 30,000 troops.

On the morning of Dec. 8, 1941, Japanese forces made amphibious landings in Thailand and northern Malaya. The Japanese 25th Army and supporting units under General Tomoyuki Yamashita advanced rapidly down the peninsula against some 140,000 British and Commonwealth defenders.

Led by Lt. Gen. Arthur Percival, the Allied troops were generally road bound, poorly trained in jungle warfare, and lacking effective air or naval support. A faulty British assumption the terrain was unsuited to armor left them without tank support, while the Japanese

employed some 200 armored vehicles. The loss of British aircraft and airfields, and the sinking of the Royal Navy capital ships *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* by land-based Japanese aircraft, handed Yamashita air and sea superiority.

Trained for jungle warfare and highly mobile, the 25th Army outflanked the British with amphibious and infiltration operations. By New Year's Day 1942 Allied forces had withdrawn to Singapore Island. The 54-day running battle cost the Japanese 4,000 casualties against some 25,000 British casualties.

Percival still had nearly two-thirds more troops available than Yamashita—and the mile-wide Johore Strait provided a buffer. But there were no fixed defenses on the island's north coast, and the big guns the British did have lacked sufficient high-explosive rounds. Percival spread his forces along the 30-mile coast in a defensive scheme that lacked depth, flexibility and mutual support. Thinking the Japanese assault would come against the northeast coast, he stationed his strongest division in that sector, while the well-informed Japanese crossed the

channel on February 8 and struck the northwest coast. Yamashita's initial landing force of 13,000 men quickly overran the 3,000 Australian defenders in that sector, and another 10,000 Japanese followed within hours. After a series of uncoordinated counterattacks, Percival's forces withdrew toward the south end of the island.

Instead of launching a major counterattack or resorting to urban combat (both of which Yamashita dreaded, given his dearth of men and supplies), Percival surrendered Singapore and his entire force on February 15 in what Winston Churchill described as the worst disaster in British military history.

Lessons:


Don't assume away your enemy's capabilities. Believing the Malaysian jungles to be largely impassable, the British were continually outflanked and overrun by the Japanese.

Intelligence and deception are significant force multipliers.

The Japanese scoped out Singapore's defenses, deceived Percival as to their landing zone and concentrated their forces to achieve overwhelming combat power at the point of attack.

The bigger force doesn't necessarily win. The British surrendered to a force barely one-third their size. Their lack of air and naval support, inadequate training, low morale and poor senior leadership negated their overwhelming advantage in numbers.

You don't need to kill the enemy to defeat him. The Japanese troops' excellent training, tenacity, aggressive and innovative tactics, and superior mobility bewildered and demoralized British forces and rendered the leadership of Percival and his senior commanders weak and ineffective. MH









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
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




- 1. Head-down sighting system viewfinder
- 2. Armored glass windscreen
- 3. Kevlar armored seat
- 4. Co-pilot/gunner cockpit
- 5. Pilot cockpit
- 6. Main rotor blade
- 7. Vibration absorber
- 8. AN/APG-78 Longbow millimetric radar
- 9. Main gearbox


- 10. Black hole infrared suppressor
- 11. General Electric T700-GE-701C engine
- 12. Tail rotor transmission shaft
- 13. Chaff and flare dispenser
- 14. UHF aerial
- 15. Engine transmission gearbox
- 16. Generator
- 17. Static discharger

- 18. 19-round 2.75-inch Hydra 70 rocket launcher
- 19. Missile launch rails
- 20. Rockwell AGM-114 Hellfire laser- or radar-guided air-to-surface missile
- **21.** TADS/PNVS swiveling turret
- 22. Target Acquisition and Designation System (TADS)
- 23. Pilot Night Vision System (PNVS)



While the Apache proved an agile, potent weapon during its 1989 combat debut in Panama and in the 1990–91 Gulf War (see P. 38), operational limitations came to light, leading to a series of improvements that included a global positioning system (GPS), new rotor blades and radios, and improved navigation systems on the AH-64B, followed by further upgrades in the AH-64C. The AH-64D featured new avionics and, most significant, Longbow radar mounted atop the main rotor to provide millimeter-wave guidance for "fire and forget" AGM-114L Hellfire missiles, all 16 of which the gunner could fire while the pilot kept the helicopter concealed behind terrain features. Boeing has since packed further electronic refinements into the Apache D's expanded cheek fairings.

After participating in peacekeeping operations, the AH-64D came into its own during the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. There the aircraft provided the 101st Airborne Division with close support conventional aircraft could not, while surviving tremendous punishment from gunfire and SA-7s to bring their crews home. Apaches have since proven themselves in Iraq and with a number of foreign users, the most active of which has been Israel. MH





arly on Nov. 4, 1979, hundreds of Iranian science and engineering students—furious that American President Jimmy Carter had granted asylum to the ailing and recently exiled Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi—descended on the chained gate and 8- to 12-foot-high brick walls of the chancery, the main building of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Although the diplomats, staff and military personnel within the compound had every reason to be alarmed, they should not have been surprised.

Nearly nine months earlier, on February 14—the same day Muslim extremists in Kabul, Afghanistan, kidnapped and murdered U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs—Islamic militants in Tehran had stormed the embassy. Although the invaders held the building for only a few hours, they wounded and kidnapped Marine security guard Sergeant Kenneth Krause, tortured him and threatened to execute him before officials secured his release a week later.

In the November attack the insurgents—members of a fundamentalist group calling itself the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line—had initially planned the in-



President Jimmy Carter toasts Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1977. Continuing U.S. support for the monarch helped fuel anti-American sentiment throughout Iran. cursion only as a symbolic show of force. "It was supposed to be a small, short-term affair," Ebrahim Asgharzadeh, one of the leaders of the takeover, told a *GQ* reporter in 2009. "We were just a bunch of stu-

dents who wanted to show our dismay at the United States. After that it got out of control."

Ordered not to shoot into the crowd, the embassy's 13 Marine security guards (see P. 28) fired tear gas, which proved ineffectual as the insurgents scaled the walls and surged through the gates. As demonstrators arrived by the


busload, the students held guns to the heads of two embassy personnel, threatening to shoot unless those inside opened the steel doors. When the inhabitants complied, the students surged into the chancery, rounding up those within. As Marine security guard Sergeant William Gallegos later remembered, "They tied us up, blindfolded us, dragged us outside." The insurgents then paraded the 66 Americans before Iranian news cameras. For most of the hostages, it was the beginning of an odyssey that would not end for another year and 79 days.

"In retrospect," writes author Mark Bowden in his 2006 book *Guests of the Ayatollah*, the embassy takeover "was all too predictable. An operating American embassy in the heart of revolutionary Iran's capital was too much for Tehran's aroused citizenry to bear."

There was nothing new in America's presence in Iran, although others had gotten there first. The two biggest players for control of its precious oil reserves were Britain and Russia. In 1907 the two nations "split" Persia (as the country was known) into three spheres of influence, each power claiming one section with a neutral zone separating them. By forcing the economic divide, they effectively squelched Persia's efforts to establish its budding constitutional monarchy. The following year the Anglo-Persian Oil Co.—a government-funded private enterprise that would become British Petroleum, or BP—became the first company to take advantage of the region's oil reserves.

The United States didn't become actively involved in Iran until World War II, when control of Middle Eastern oil was vital to an Allied victory. In 1941 newly allied Britain and Russia installed a compliant 21-year-old Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as shah, and President Franklin Roosevelt sent thousands of American troops into Iran to help run and maintain the country's Allied-built Trans-Iranian Railway. Although U.S. troops were withdrawn at war's end, the United States, according to Middle East historian John P. Miglietta, "began to broaden its aims in the country and the region as a whole. These centered around acquiring control of Iranian oil, as well as maintaining Iran as a strategic bulwark against the Soviet Union during the Cold War."

The extent of American involvement in Iran became clear in 1953. The shah had become embroiled in a power struggle with Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who, since his appointment in 1951, had nationalized the renamed Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., seized its assets and cut off diplomatic relations with Britain. In the wake of a failed August attempt to overthrow Mossadegh, the shah fled to Rome.



Later that month the new Eisenhower administration—committed to protecting Iran's petroleum exports and concerned Mossadegh would lean on the Soviet Union for support—authorized a second joint U.S./British coup. While succeeding in restoring the shah to power, the coup claimed hundreds of Iranian lives, the popular Mossadegh was imprisoned for treason and a number of his devotees were executed. His followers never forgot or forgave America's role in the affair. The shah continued to receive the unflagging support of each subsequent U.S. presidential administration as he continued to build a world-class arsenal for his army, at one time becoming America's largest arms purchaser. Ultimately, the United States authorized him to buy nuclear reactors for power generation.

Ever fearful of internal dissension, the shah enlisted the CIA to help him create a secret police, domestic security and intelligence service, whose Iranian acronym was SAVAK. Described by historian David Farber as "internationally infamous for the brutality, cruelty and macabre creativity of its torturers," the organization was widely feared, and with good reason; thousands of political dissidents—many facing torture and death—soon found themselves in Iranian prisons without having been tried.

The year 1963 saw the emergence of an extraordinary fundamentalist leader in Iran. Although many Americans still regard him as a single-minded fanatic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was a scholarly, charismatic individual who combined an appreciation of ancient Persian poetry with a thorough knowledge of, and devotion to, the Quran. A Shia Muslim cleric, he gained national recognition with what

Khomeini spoke publicly and vehemently against the United States, Israel and the shah

writer Eugene Solomon called "a captivating moral urgency and prophetic power." Khomeini spoke publicly and vehemently against the United States, Israel and the shah, calling the latter a "wretched, miserable man." In 1964 the shah drove the cleric into what would become a 15-year exile in Turkey, Iraq and France.

By the late 1970s a groundswell of anti-shah and anti-American anger and resentment, combined with a growing



Iranian student militants scale the fence surrounding the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on Nov. 4, 1979, and later hold a demonstration inside the compound, opposite. The takeover initially caught Khomeini by surprise, but he soon embraced the event as a way to goad the nation he termed the "Great Satan."

> trend toward Islamic fundamentalism, had brought Iran to the brink of revolution. Ironically, the U.S. president who became the target of decades of anti-Western resentment was arguably the most committed human rights advocate to occupy the White House since Abraham Lincoln.

> **Few of even his most** fervent political adversaries questioned Jimmy Carter's good intentions. His ingrained sense of Christian morality and belief in the innate goodness of man formed the invisible plank in his surprisingly successful 1976 presidential campaign. Virtually unknown just months before the election, he won the presidency with scarcely 50 percent of the popular vote.

> Carter's term began on a positive note. A newcomer to international affairs, he held 60 meetings with foreign heads of state in his first year. His record on human rights was stellar, and he was not shy about flagging civil rights violations in other countries. "I feel very deeply," he stated in a 1977 town meeting, "that when people are put in prison without trials and tortured and deprived of basic human rights that the president of the United States ought to have a right

to express displeasure and to do something about it." His apparently inflexible stance provided encouragement to resistance movements in such countries as Russia and Poland. As he wrote to Soviet dissident and Nobel Peace Prize recipient Andrei Sakharov in February 1977, "We shall use our good offices to seek the release of prisoners of conscience."

In September 1978 Carter achieved the seemingly impossible. Over a contentious two-week stay at the presidential retreat Camp David, Md., he brought Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to the peace table, alternately reasoning with, cajoling, begging and bullying them into signing the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel." It was world-class diplomacy on Carter's part, for which the two co-signers shared the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize.

From the beginning of his administration, however, Carter had confronted problems that, although perhaps not of his making, would prove his undoing. For one thing he had inherited a post-Vietnam War economy that was bad and rapidly growing worse. During his administration the stock market hit a 28-year low, unemployment rose, the nation's trade deficit grew and the country experienced an energy crisis that saw gas and oil costs soar and gas station lines grow progressively longer. Carter beseeched Americans to tighten their belts and asked industry leaders to hold the line on prices and wages until the crises passed. Unfortunately for



Carter, his "voluntary control" solution was not the message people wanted to hear, and his approval rating plummeted.

To exacerbate matters the president proved ineffectual in dealing with Congress. Carter could be resistant to the point of stubbornness, his strong sense of "Christian humbleness," as historian Douglas Brinkley called it, often coming across as self-righteousness bordering on arrogance and hubris. And he often got bogged down in the details. According to James Fallows, Carter's former chief speechwriter, "[The president] often seemed more concerned with taking the correct position than with learning how to turn that position into results." Although serving in a government in which politicians made deals and passed bills on a give-and-take basis, Carter often refused to compromise and staunchly resisted action based on political expediency. As veteran congressman and Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill observed, "He never understood how the system worked."

During his run for the presidency Jimmy Carter had stated, "Never again should our country become militarily involved in the internal affairs of another country unless there is a direct and obvious threat to the security of the United States or its people." Ironically, the one arena in which that stance was seemingly absent was in his dealings with Iran.

Carter saw the U.S. relationship with the shah as a timehonored, successful and necessary one. In consideration of Iran's proximity to the Soviet border, its position as a secure source of oil and its growing military strength in the region, Carter was willing to close his eyes to the shah's notorious human rights violations, opting instead for a policy of what one might call "situational morality"—or to put it bluntly, lying to oneself.

During a 1977 New Year's Eve toast at a state dinner in Tehran, Carter said, "Iran, because of the great leadership of the shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world." Yet within a week of Carter's televised toast, anti-shah demonstrations rocked the streets of the Iranian capital. Student protesters burned and trampled

Carter saw the U.S. relationship with the shah as a time-honored, successful and necessary one

American flags and effigies of the president, and police opened fire on the protesters, killing several. Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, later commented, "We knew there was some resentment, we knew somewhat of the history of the country, but we were not conscious, nor were we informed, of the intensity of the feel-



Iran's prolonged detention of the American hostages, and the slow pace of negotiations toward their release, prompted the Carter administration to launch a rescue attempt (see map). The operation was an abject failure, and an aircraft collision at Desert One, opposite, took the lives of eight U.S. servicemen.

ings." As State Department spokesman Hodding Carter III observed: "Our information out of Iran was crappy to non-existent. We had nobody who spoke Farsi, and what passed for our intelligence was what was given to us by SAVAK, since the shah, paranoid as he was, had gotten an agreement from us that we would not infiltrate Iran with our own intelligence people. The shah himself had been our chief source of information about internal dissent!"

Just over a year later, on Feb. 1, 1979, Khomeini responded to the upsurge in popular support by ending his exile and returning to Iran. Two weeks earlier the shah—weakened by cancer and faced with an army mutiny and rioting in the streets—had abdicated, leaving Khomeini the self-declared supreme leader of an Iran in tumultuous transition. Although Iranians would soon elect economist and politician Abolhassan Banisadr as the first post-revolution president, no one questioned who ran the country. On his arrival Khomeini called for the expulsion of all foreigners, and the U.S. State Department immediately evacuated some 1,350 Americans.

Student protesters in Tehran had not consulted Khomeini prior to their Nov. 4, 1979, attack on the U.S. Embassy, and when he first heard they had taken the compound, he responded with irritation and ordered them "kicked out." On reflection he reversed himself, seeing in the takeover a perfect opportunity to challenge the "Great Satan," as he called the United States. It would serve to focus international attention on America's decades-long involvement in Iran. The hostages themselves would serve as pawns, to be

exchanged only when the exiled shah himself was returned for trial and, presumably, execution. Most important, it would solidify Khomeini's power base.

From the outset of the crisis the return of the shah was a non-negotiable condition for the Iranians. When Carter had graciously allowed the shah to enter the United States that October to undergo and recover from surgery, Iranian revolutionaries suspected another coup was in the works. "The United States made a mistake taking in the shah," hostage taker Saeed Hajjarian told *GQ*. "People in Iran were very sensitive to this issue. If they had not admitted him, nothing would have happened." Carter himself appreciated the potential fallout for providing the shah refuge. After making the difficult decision, he had turned to national security adviser Gary Sick and asked, "I just wonder what advice you're going to give me when they take our people hostage."

Meanwhile, the hostages were getting a sense of what life would be like under their captors. "Eventually, they put us into rooms with 24-hour guards," recalled embassy press attaché Barry Rosen. "We were tied up, hand and foot. You felt like a piece of meat." Rosen noted the disturbing Iranian tendency to compartmentalize: "They'd beat the freakin' hell out of you, and then they'd ask, 'When this is all over, can I get a visa?'"

The captors jammed some captives into closets or locked them in dark rooms. "It was like living in a tomb," recalled Vice Consul Richard Queen. They subjected others to mock executions, seemingly for amusement.

Less than two weeks after the attack the Iranians released 13 of the 66 hostages. Eight were black, with whom the insurgents claimed kinship as an oppressed minority; the other five were female, freed, claimed Khomeini, because Islam respects women. The remaining 53 captives were forbidden to speak with one another, although some devised clever methods of communicating through notes and secret gestures.



With each passing day, hearing no news except what their captors fed them, the hostages grew less certain their situation was a priority back home. That Christmas the Iranians allowed four clergymen to visit the captives in a room laden with food and festive decorations. But when the holiday ended, they returned the hostages to their prisonlike conditions. "In the States," said Roman Catholic Auxiliary Bishop Thomas Gumbleton of Detroit, one of the clerics, "the hostages were on the news every day, but they had no sense of that. They felt like they'd been abandoned."

In late January the captors finally allowed the hostages to converse. For many of the captives time had ceased to hold meaning. "It just kept dragging on," recalled political officer Michael Metrinko. "It wasn't something they announced at 9 in the morning, 'Oh, we've decided to hold you for 14 months.' It just sort of drifted into it."

Cloistered as they were, the hostages were unaware that a team of negotiators led by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher was working for their release. The issues were complex, with far-reaching military, political, social and economic ramifications, and the negotiating process was difficult at best. "Carter and many of his key advisers seemed to really believe that Khomeini was crazy and irrational," noted historian Farber. "They kept hoping that wiser, saner and more rationally self-interested men would take over Iran." Forced to deal with a regime in perpetual turmoil, and frustrated in their efforts to attain an honorable settlement, the U.S. negotiators found neither clarity nor a reliable Iranian spokesperson. Deputy National Security Adviser David Aaron recalled the confusion: "Somebody would step forward and say, 'I have the power,' and they'd start negotiations. Then the Khomeinists would immediately say, 'You're pro-American, you're selling out the revolution,' and that person would lose their job and sometimes their life."

The American people were in no mood to be patient. Chafing under the problems plaguing the country, many saw the drawn-out negotiating process as a further indication of Carter's weakness. America's reputation abroad also took a beating, as the world witnessed a small and fractious Middle Eastern state stonewall history's strongest nation. Journalist Roger Wilkins summed up the impression: "The whole world saw these images of these people burning American flags, stomping on images of Carter, and the most rancid sort of disrespect and hatred of the United States, on television, around the world, all the time."

Returning to Iran from 15 years in exile, Khomeini called for the expulsion of all foreigners

By the spring of 1979 Americans had festooned trees and lampposts nationwide with yellow ribbons in remembrance of the hostages and were demanding the president bring them home. Even Carter's wife, Rosalynn, pressured him to be more proactive. "I would say, 'Why don't you do something?' And he said, 'What would you want me to do?' I said, 'Mine the harbors.' He said, 'OK, suppose I mine the harbors, and they decide to take one hostage out every day and kill him. What am I going to do then?'"

Initially, Carter was adamant in his refusal to consider the use of force. "The problem," he reasoned, "is that we could feel good for a few hours—until we found that they had killed our people." Finally, however, after months of failure at the negotiating table, he concluded, "We could no longer afford to depend on diplomacy." Against the fervid advice of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the president authorized a military

rescue operation designated Eagle Claw and comprising a 132-man force drawn from the Army's 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (aka Delta Force) and 75th Ranger Regiment; 15 translators; three Air Force MC-130 Combat Talon transports; three Air Force EC-130E Commando Solo tankers; two Air Force C-141 Starlifter transports; eight Navy RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters based aboard the carrier *Nimitz* in the Arabian Sea; and various other supporting Navy and Air Force strike and electronic warfare aircraft.

The rescue mission was intended as a two-part operation. The first task was to establish a staging area, dubbed Desert One, at a remote location in central Iran. The MC-130s would fly in the Delta troops from an island of Oman. The soldiers would then board the RH-53D helicopters and stage forward to an assault base, Desert Two, some 50 miles outside Tehran. On the second night of the operation the Delta operators would drive overland to Tehran and assault the embassy

compound. Having eliminated enemy forces and secured the hostages, the team would rendezvous with the helicopters at a Tehran stadium, airlift to the waiting transports and leave Iran and the hostage crisis behind.

Launched on April 24, 1980, the raid was an abject failure. One inbound RH-53D experienced a malfunction and put down in the desert. The remaining helicopters flew into a dust storm, which forced one to turn back and damaged the hydraulics on another. Left with just five operational helicopters, the ground element commander, Colonel Charles Beckwith, reluctantly opted to abort. As one of the RH-53Ds maneuvered to make room for a departing EC-130, it clipped the tanker's tail and crashed into its wing root. The resultant explosion killed eight servicemen. Leaving behind the wreckage and charred remains of their comrades, the team returned home. "We left eight guys on this pyre in the middle of the desert," recalled Delta Force operations officer Major Bucky Burruss. "That's something you live with forever."

Carter took full responsibility for the failed rescue attempt, his reputation suffering a blow from which it never recovered. A *Time*

cover story titled "Debacle in the Desert" observed, "His image as inept has been renewed." *The Washington Post* simply declared Carter "unfit to be president at a time of crisis." There would be no further rescue attempts; the Iranians relocated the hostages. "They panicked and spread us all over the country in 48 hours," recalled embassy military attaché Joseph Hall. "I think I was moved 17 times during the next two months."

On July 11, the 250th day of the crisis, Vice Consul Queen joined the 13 other released hostages after a doctor



discovered he was suffering from multiple sclerosis. That left 52 in captivity. With the threat of military action off the table, their only hope for release was successful diplomacy.

Sixteen days later the shah died in an Egyptian hospital. Since his return was the primary condition for release of the hostages, many in Washington hoped his death would end the ordeal. But there was no change in the Iranian stance.

Election Day that year fell on November 4, the anniversary of the embassy takeover, a coincidence that further highlighted Ronald Reagan's landslide victory. Carter then faced a tight deadline if he was to affect a release of the hostages in what remained of his single term in office. In early January 1981, in accords brokered by Algerian mediators, the parties reached a satisfactory, if not mutually agreeable, resolution. Among other humiliating concessions, American negotiators pledged the United States "would not intervene politically or militarily in Iranian internal affairs" and agreed to release nearly \$8 billion in Iranian assets frozen by Carter at the outset of the crisis. Christopher signed the accords on Jan. 19, 1981, Carter's last day in office. All that remained was for Iran to honor its part of the deal.

In those final hours in the White House, Carter and his senior advisers stayed up all night in the Oval Office, waiting for the call announcing the release of the hostages.

Man of the

In its Jan. 7, 1980,

issue Time named

Ayatollah Khomeini

its man of the year—a distinction the magazine

had also bestowed on

figures as Adolf Hitler

Barraged by widespread

outrage regarding the

selection, Time insisted

the choice did not imply

acceptance of the

individual's actions.

such objectionable

and Joseph Stalin.

Year? Really?



Morning would see the swearing-in of Reagan as 40th president of the United States, and Carter wanted the satisfaction of knowing the 52 long-suffering American hostages had been released on his watch.

It was not to be. Only after Reagan had taken the oath of office and completed his inaugural address did an airliner carrying the hostages leave Tehran bound for West Germany. It was the ultimate slap in the face to the man who had labored tactfully—and ultimately, successfully—for 14 months for the release of his countrymen.

It then fell to Reagan to announce the release of the hostages and to bask in the resultant patriotic glow. To many observers the hostage crisis marked Carter's last failure as president, and Reagan's first success, albeit unearned. Neither he nor any of his transition team had participated in negotiations, nor did Reagan initially credit the outgoing president for the hostages' release. The American people, however, could finally untie their yellow ribbons and breathe a collective sigh of relief. After a harrowing, humiliating and seemingly endless wait, the hostages were home.

What neither Carter, nor his advisers nor the American people realized was that the Iran hostage crisis was not simply a one-off event engineered by a religious fanatic. History is nothing if not a continuum, and students of

On Jan. 27, 1981, jubilant crowds of well-wishers, opposite and above, greet the hostages in Washington, D.C., following their release and flight home to the United States. To many observers the hostage crisis marked Carter's last failure as president and Reagan's first success.

history might well trace a direct line from the street revolutions of the late 1970s to the Arab Spring of the 2010s and ultimately to the terrorist organizations currently rampaging throughout the world. Although the United States hadn't met all their conditions, the ayatollah and his followers considered the hostage crisis and resulting accords a success. After all, they had demonstrated that a small group of unswervingly committed believers with limited resources could hold the world's most powerful nation hostage for an extended period of time, and they had done so on a global stage. It is a lesson the United States seemingly has yet to learn. MH

Freelance writer Ron Soodalter is the author of Hanging Captain Gordon. For further reading he recommends Guests of the Ayatollah: The Iran Hostage Crisis: The First Battle in America's War with Militant Islam, by Mark Bowden; American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis, by Warren Christopher, et. al; and Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America's First Encounter with Radical Islam, by David Farber.

NDY GLASS STUDIO

IRAN HOSTAGE SERGEANT ROCKY SICKMANN REMEMBERS

Born in 1957 in suburban St. Louis, Mo., Rodney V. "Rocky" Sickmann enlisted in the Marines in 1975 in the wake of the Vietnam War. He spent a few years in the infantry before joining the Marine Corps Security Guard Battalion (presentday Marine Corps Embassy Security Group), which watches over U.S. Embassies worldwide. In October 1979 Sergeant Sickmann was posted to the embassy in Tehran, Iran. Weeks later, on November 4, radical Islamic students stormed the compound and took Sickmann and 51 other Americans captive. Over the next 444 days he and his fellow hostages endured privation and torture as officials sought their release. On April 24, 1980, eight U.S. servicemen died during a failed rescue attempt known as Operation Eagle Claw (see P. 18). To secure the hostages' release, President Jimmy Carter's administration signed an accord on Jan. 19, 1981, that among other concessions removed a freeze on nearly \$8 billion in Iranian assets and included a pledge "not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran's internal affairs." The next day, within minutes of Ronald Reagan's inauguration as U.S. president, Iran released the hostages. Soon after arriving home, Sickmann left the Marines for a successful career in sales. He now works for Folds of Honor [foldsofhonor.org], a nonprofit that provides scholarships to the children and spouses of U.S. military men and women disabled or killed in service to their country.

Describe the embassy attack.

The Iranians had been demonstrating because the United States had admitted the shah. There was a demonstration again that day in front of the embassy. I'd planned to run errands in town and was walking down to the motor pool when my walkie-talkie blared "Recall! Recall!" The dem-



onstrators were coming over the main entrance gate, and the Iranian guards who were supposed to be protecting us walked away like nothing was happening.

I ran back to the embassy. Billy Gallegos, a fellow Marine security guard, was sealing down the building, securing it with steel doors. He kept it open long enough for me to get in. Then we donned our gas masks and flak jackets and retrieved our shotguns and snub-nosed .38s. My adrenaline was pumping. At the same time I was concerned. There were only a couple of us in the embassy.

How did they gain entry to the chancery?

As I watched, the Iranians approached, holding signs with messages like This Is a Peaceful Demonstration. Then they were pounding on the front door, and I heard they'd gained access to the basement. So I ran downstairs, and around the corner through smoke and debris come four Iranian women being forced forward by Iranian men. That's when we start hearing orders: "Don't fire! Don't antagonize! Help is on the way." So we withdrew upstairs behind the steel doors.

Smoke was coming in under the door, as we had popped tear gas. Then the attackers started bringing Americans to the door. There we were, safe on the other side, and we'd hear someone on the other side yell, "They've got a gun to my head, and if you don't open the door, they're going to kill me!" Then they'd bring another person begging for his or her life.

Somebody was in communication with the White House or State Department, and they were asking what was happening. At that point we were ordered to give ourselves up, and the government would resolve things diplomatically. That was Nov. 4, 1979, and we weren't released until Jan. 20, 1981. So that morning 52 Americans were stripped of their freedom, dignity and pride for 444 days.

Do you wish you had opened fire?

After being taken, yes. But it's the military: You receive orders, and you execute orders. In retrospect, had we fired on the Iranian women, the men would have paraded their bodies outside, claiming the Marines had shot unarmed, innocent women. Then they would have all come unglued. We probably would have gotten everybody killed.

Did your captors single out you and your fellow Marines?

At the beginning we were all separated—none of us saw everyone again until released on Jan. 20, 1981. A picture of every Marine was up on the wall of our post, so they knew who we were. They wanted us to make derogatory statements and made it pretty rough. We just gave them name, rank and serial number.

What sort of torture did you and the others endure?

Mental, physical and psychological.

I knew there was a fleet on standby in the Mediterranean, as I was on that fleet when the embassy was attacked in February 1979. So I'm sitting there on the first day, thinking, *Hey, those guys are coming to get us—they're coming to rescue us.* The first day comes, the second....The first month was pretty tough. Imagine 444 days.

At first we were handcuffed, hands behind our backs. We sat like that for hours, sometimes days. I spent an entire week tied in a bed. We went outside seven times, 15 minutes total, in those 444 days. We don't even treat our war prisoners like that.

The worst time was the night they stripped us from our room, took us down the hallway and put us up against the wall, an Iranian behind each of us with a weapon. They're all screaming. You think it's a rescue operation, and you're thinking, *This is it.* Because they always told us, "If the United States comes, you will die before they get to you."

You're in a foreign country, 7,000 miles from home. You're not allowed to talk to anybody. Your mind plays game after game. You don't know if you're going to live or die. You hate everybody, yourself, your government. Trust me, it is one of your worst nightmares, something you don't ever forget.

How did you withstand the ordeal?

Thank God for my wonderful childhood, my parents, how they brought us up. They taught us love of country, respect for the flag, love of family and religion. I've never prayed so hard in my life.

What stays with you?

Eight people lost their lives trying to regain my freedom. How does anybody forget such people?

Did the government revise embassy security procedures?

In the Embassy Security Group are regional groups of Marines. Whenever they hear of a hostile act in a foreign country, these reaction-force Marines are brought in to help provide security. And in 1987 Congress created the Special Operations Command to help prevent another failed rescue attempt.

But then Benghazi happened. These guys were calling for help—there were supposed to be measures in place. How could that have happened with such precautionary measures in place?

Do you agree with how U.S. officials handled the crisis?

President Carter was a kind, good man. But Iran ate him up. They just used him. The Iranians told me, "It is not you we hate, it's your government—but we will use you to humiliate your government." And they did exactly that to Carter. He tried a rescue attempt—that failed. He then tried to negotiate. The day they paid that \$8 billion is the day that they fed the animal—and he's going to want to be fed again.


I truly believe the War on Terror started Nov. 4, 1979, when the Iranians took our embassy

Should the United States negotiate with terrorists or the nation-states that support them?

Never. I truly believe the War on Terror started Nov. 4, 1979, when the Iranians took our embassy, and we didn't do anything about it. Since then they have rubbed it in our face one incident after another, and we've never held them accountable.

How should we handle Iran?

Sanctions work pretty well. We should tighten them to the point it makes them squirm. Instead, we just gave them all this money. I don't think it's going toward solving poverty in Iran, and I don't think it's going into human rights. It's paying for other terrorist events around the world. MH



Hernán Cortés himself—not Spanish arms, smallpox or Mesoamerican allies was the catalyst behind the stunning defeat of the Aztec empire By Justin D. Lyons

For his astounding overthrow of the Aztec empire Hernán Cortés earned royal appointment as governor of the conquered territory, dubbed New Spain.





n Aug. 13, 1521, Spanish conquistador Hernán Cortés received the surrender of Cuauhtémoc, ruler of the Aztec people. The astonishing handover occurred amid the ruins of Tenochtitlan, the shattered capital of a mighty empire whose influence had stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific and extended from central Mexico south into parts of what would become Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. After an 80-day siege Cortés had come to a terrible resolution: He ordered the city razed. House by house, street by street, building by building, his men pulled down Tenochtitlan's walls and smashed them into rubble. Envoys from every tribe in the former empire later came to gaze on the wrecked remains of the city that had held them in subjection and fear for so long.

But how had Cortés accomplished his conquest? Less than three years had passed since he set foot on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, yet he had destroyed the greatest power in Mesoamerica with a relative handful of men. His initial force comprised 11 ships, 110 sailors, 553 soldiers—including 32 crossbowmen and 13 bearing harquebuses (early firearms)—10 heavy guns, four falconets and 16 horses. The force size ebbed and flowed, but he never commanded more than the 1,300 Spaniards he had with him at the start of the final assault.

On its face such a victory would suggest Cortés was a commander of tremendous ability. Yet scholars of the period have long underrated his generalship, instead attributing his success to three distinct factors. First was the relative superiority of Spanish military technology. Second is the notion smallpox had so severely reduced the Aztecs that they were unable mount an effective resistance. And third is the belief Cortés' Mesoamerican allies were largely to credit for his triumph.



The conquistadors' military technology was unquestionably superior to that of every tribe they encountered. The warriors' weapons and armor were made of wood, stone and hide, while those of the Spaniards were wrought of iron and steel. Atlatls, slings and simple bows—their missiles tipped with obsidian, flint or fish bone—could not match the power or range of the crossbow. Clubs and macuahuitls—fearsome wooden swords embedded with flakes of obsidian—were far outclassed by long pikes and swords of Toledo steel, which easily pierced warriors' crude armor of cotton, fabric and feathers. And, finally, the Spaniards' gunpowder weapons —small cannon and early shoulder-fired weapons like the harquebus—wreaked havoc among the Mesoamericans, who possessed no similar technology.

The Spaniards also benefitted from their use of the horse, which was unknown to Mesoamericans. Though the conquistadors had few mounts at their disposal, tribal foot soldiers simply could not match the speed, mobility or shock effect of the Spanish cavalry, nor were their weapons suited to repelling horsemen.

When pitted against European military science and practice, the Mesoamerican way of war also suffered from undeni-



able weaknesses. While the tribes put great emphasis on order in battle—they organized their forces into companies, each under its own chieftain and banner, and understood the value of orderly advances and withdrawals—their tactics were relatively unsophisticated. They employed such maneuvers as feigned retreats, ambushes and ambuscades but failed to grasp the importance of concentrating forces against a single point of the enemy line or of supporting and relieving forward assault units. Such deficiencies allowed the conquistadors to triumph even when outnumbered by as much as 100-to-1.

Deeply ingrained aspects of their culture also hampered the Aztecs. Social status was partly dependent on skill in battle, which was measured not by the number of enemies killed, but by the number captured for sacrifice to the gods. Thus warriors did not fight with the intention of killing their enemies outright, but of wounding or stunning them so they could be bound and passed back through the ranks. More than one Spaniard, downed and struggling, owed his life to this practice, which enabled his fellows to rescue him. Further, the Mesoamerican forces were unprepared for lengthy campaigns, as their dependence on levies of agricultural workers placed limits on their ability to mobilize and

Aztec ruler Montezuma II extended Cortés a peaceful if wary welcome when the latter arrived in the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlan in 1519. Montezuma wanted to assess his potential foes' weaknesses before meeting them in battle. But his gifts of gold only excited the Spaniards' thirst for plunder.

sustain sufficient forces. They could not wage war effectively during the planting and harvest seasons, nor did they undertake campaigns in the May–September rainy season. Night actions were also unusual. The conquistadors, on the other hand, were trained to kill their enemies on the field of battle and were ready to fight year-round, day or night, in whatever conditions until they achieved victory.

That the Spaniards enjoyed distinct technological, tactical and cultural advantages over their Mesoamerican foes does not mean Cortés' victories came easy. He engaged hundreds of thousands of determined enemies on their home ground with only fitful opportunities for reinforcement and resupply. Two telltale facts indicate that his success against New World opponents was as much the result of solid leadership as of technological superiority. First, despite his sparse resources, Cortés was as successful against Europeans who possessed the same technology as he was against Mesoamer-



ican forces. Second, Cortés showed he could prevail against the Aztecs even when fighting at a distinct disadvantage.

In April 1520, as the position of the conquistadors in Tenochtitlan became increasingly precarious, then Aztec ruler Montezuma II—whom the Spaniards had held hostage since the previous November—was informed Cortés' ships had arrived at Cempoala on the Gulf Coast bearing the Spaniard's countrymen, and he encouraged the conquistador to depart without delay. While Cortés' troops were elated at what they assumed was impending deliverance, the commander himself rightly suspected the new arrivals were not allies. They had been sent by Diego Velázquez de Cuéllar, governor of Cuba, whose orders Cortés had disobeyed in 1519 to launch his expedition, and their purpose was to punish rather than reinforce.

New World Force Multiplier

The dart-throwing atlatl enabled Aztec warriors to launch their stone-tipped projectiles much greater

Ine dart-throwing atlati enabled Aztec warriors to launch their stone-tipped projectiles much greater distances and at far higher velocities—up to 93 mph. Unfortunately for the Aztecs, it was no match for Spanish steel swords, let alone guns and cannons.

Reports from the coast indicated the fleet comprised 18 ships bearing some 900 soldiers—including 80 cavalrymen, 80 harquebusiers and 150 crossbowmen—all well provisioned and supported by heavy guns. The captain-general of the armada was Pánfilo de Narváez, a confidant of Velázquez, who made no secret of his intention to seize Cortés and imprison him for his rebellion against the governor's authority.

Cortés could not afford to hesitate and thus allow Narváez time to gather strength and allies. Yet to march out of Tenochtitlan to engage the new arrivals also presented significant risks. If Cortés took his entire force, he would have to abandon the Aztec capital. Montezuma II would reassume the throne, and resistance would no doubt congeal and stiffen, making re-entry a matter of blood and battle, in contrast to the tentative welcome he had initially received. But to leave behind a garrison would further reduce

the size of the already outnumbered force he would lead against Narváez. With the swift decision of the bold, a factor indeterminable by numerical calculation, the Spanish commander chose the latter course.

Cortés marched out with only 70 lightly armed soldiers, leaving his second-in-command, Pedro de Alvarado, to hold Tenochtitlan with two-thirds of the Spanish force, including all of the artillery, the bulk of the cavalry and



most of the harquebusiers. Having done all he could to gain an edge over Narváez by feeding his couriers misinformation and undermining the loyalty of his officers with forwarded bribes of gold, Cortés marched with all speed. He crossed the mountains to Cholula, where he mustered 120 reinforcements, then marched through Tlaxcala and down to the coast at Veracruz, picking up another 60 men. Though still outnumbered more than 3-to-1, Cortés brought all his craft, daring and energy to bear and, in a rapid assault amid heavy rain on the night of May 27, overwhelmed his foes. Narváez himself was captured, while most of his men, enticed by stories of Aztec riches, readily threw in their lot with Cortés. Soon after his surprise defeat of Narváez, the bold conquistador proved himself equally capable of defeating Mesoamerican forces that held a numerical advantage.

On his return to Tenochtitlan, Cortés discovered Alvarado had indulged in an unprovoked massacre of the Aztecs, stirring the previously docile populace to murderous fury. The Spaniards quickly found themselves trapped and besieged in the capital, and hard fighting in the streets failed to subdue the enemy. Not even Montezuma could soothe his people, who met their emperor's appeal for peace with a shower of stones that mortally wounded him. With the Spanish force growing short of food and water, and losing more men by the day, Cortés decided to withdraw from the city on the night

After fleeing the Aztec capital in a brutal running battle known as the Night of Sorrows, Cortés gathered reinforcements and supplies for his subsequent conquest of Tenochtitlan, above. Cortés proclaimed his victories in letters to Holy Roman Emperor Charles V and included a map of Tenochtitlan, opposite.

of June 30–July 1. After a brutal running fight along a cause-way leading to shore, the column was reduced to a tattered remnant, leaving Cortés with no more than one-fifth of the force he had originally led into Tenochtitlan. The overnight battle—the worst military disaster the conquistadors had suffered in the New World—would go down in Spanish history as *La Noche Triste* ("The Night of Sorrows").

The debacle left Cortés with few materiel advantages. Only half of his horses survived, and the column had lost all of its powder, ammunition and artillery and most of its crossbows and harquebuses during the retreat. Yet the Spanish commander managed to hold together his flagging force. Skirting north to avoid a cluster of hostile villages, he headed toward Tlaxcala, home city of his Mesoamerican allies.

Over the days that followed Aztec skirmishers shadowed Cortés' retreating column, and as the Spaniards neared the Tlaxcalan frontier, the skirmishers joined forces with warriors from Tenochtitlan and assembled on the plain of Otumba, between the conquistadors and their refuge. The trap thus set, on July 7 the numerically superior Aztecs and beleaguered Spaniards met in a battle that should easily

have gone in the Mesoamericans' favor. Again, however, Cortés turned the tables by skillfully using his remaining cavalry to break up the enemy formations. Then, in a daring stroke, he personally led a determined cavalry charge that targeted the enemy commander, killing him and capturing his colors. Seeing their leader slain, the Aztecs gradually fell back, ultimately enabling the conquistadors to push their way through. Though exhausted, starving and ill, they were soon among allies and safe from assault.

One long-standing school of thought on the Spanish conquest attributes Cortés' success to epidemiological whim—namely that European-introduced smallpox had so ravaged the Aztecs that they were incapable of mounting a coherent defense. In fact, Cortés had defeated many enemies and advanced to the heart of the empire well before the disease made its effects felt. Smallpox arrived in Cempoala in 1520, carried by an African slave accompanying the Narváez expedition. By then Cortés had already defeated an army at Pontonchan; won battles against the fierce, well-organized armies of Tlaxcala; entered the Aztec capital at Tenochtitlan and taken its ruler hostage.

Cortés seems to have possessed a special genius for conjuring success out of his adversities

Smallpox had ravaged the populations of Hispaniola and Cuba and indeed had equally disastrous effects on the mainland, killing an estimated 20 to 40 percent of the population of central Mexico. But as horrific as the pandemic was, it is by no means clear that smallpox mortality was a decisive factor in the fall of Tenochtitlan or the final Spanish victory. The disease likely reached Tenochtitlan when Cortés returned from the coast in June 1520, and by September it had killed perhaps half of the city's 200,000 residents, including Montezuma's successor, Cuitláhuac. By the time Cortés returned in the spring of 1521 for the final assault, however, the city had been largely free of the disease for six months. The conquistadors mention smallpox but not as a decisive factor in the struggle. Certainly they saw no perceptible drop in ferocity or numbers among the resistance.

On the subject of numbers, some scholars have suggested the conquest was largely the work of the Spaniards' numerous Mesoamerican allies. Soon after arriving in the New World, Cortés had learned from the coastal Totonac people that the Aztec empire was not a monolithic dominion, that there existed fractures of discontent the conquistadors might exploit. For nearly a century Mesoamericans had labored under the yoke of Aztec servitude, their overlords having imposed grievous taxes and tributary demands, including a bloody harvest of sacrificial victims. Even cities within the Valley of Mexico, the heart of the empire, were simmering

cauldrons of potential revolt. They awaited only opportunity, and the arrival of the Spaniards provided it. Tens of thousands of Totonacs, Tlaxcalans and others aided the conquest by supplying the Spaniards with food and serving as warriors, porters and laborers. Certainly their services sped the pace of the conquest. But one cannot credit them with its ultimate success. After all, had the restive tribes had the will and ability to overthrow the Aztecs on their own, they would have done so long before Cortés arrived and would likely have destroyed the Spaniards in turn.


To truly assess the Spanish victory over the Aztecs, one must also consider the internal issues Cortés faced—logistical challenges, the interference of hostile superiors, factional divides within his command and mutiny.

Cortés established coastal Veracruz as his base of operations in Mexico and primary communications link to the Spanish empire. But the tiny settlement and its fort could not provide him with additional troops, horses, firearms or ammunition. As Cortés' lean command suffered casualties and consumed its slender resources, it required reinforcement and resupply, but the Spanish commander's strained relations with the governor of Cuba ensured such vital support was not forthcoming. Fortunately for himself and the men of his command, Cortés seems to have possessed a special genius for conjuring success out of the very adversities that afflicted him.

After defeating the Narváez expedition, Cortés integrated his would-be avenger's force with his own, gaining men, arms and equipment. When the Spaniards lay exhausted in Tlaxcala after La Noche Triste, still more resources presented themselves. Velázquez, thinking Narváez must have things well in hand, with Cortés either in chains or dead, had dispatched two ships to Veracruz with reinforcements and further instructions; both were seized on arrival, their crews soon persuaded to join Cortés. Around the same time two more Spanish vessels appeared off the coast, sent by the governor of Jamaica to supply an expedition on the Pánuco River. What the ships' captains didn't know is that the party had suffered badly and its members had already joined forces with Cortés. On landing, their men too were persuaded to join the conquest. Thus Cortés acquired 150 more men, 20 horses and stores of arms and ammunition. Finally, a Spanish merchant vessel loaded with military stores put in at Veracruz, its captain having heard he might find a ready market for his goods. He was not mistaken. Cortés bought both ship and cargo, then induced its adventurous crew to join his expedition. Such reinforcement was more than enough to restore the audacity of the daring conquistador, and he began to lay plans for the siege and recovery of Tenochtitlan.

While the ever-resourceful Cortés had turned these occasions to his advantage, several episodes pointed to an underlying difficulty that had cast its shadow over the expedition from the moment of its abrupt departure from Cuba—Velázquez's seemingly unquenchable hostility and determination to interfere. Having taken leave of the governor on







In 1520 Cortés employed all his martial skills to defeat a superior, pursuing Aztec army on the plain of Otumba, top. Cortés ultimately clinched victory over the Aztecs, capturing the huey teocalli ("great temple"), above, in Tenochtitlan and securing Mexico for Spain.

less than cordial terms, Cortés was perhaps tempting fate by including of a number of the functionary's friends and partisans in the expedition. He was aware of their divided loyalties, if not overtly concerned. Some had expressed their personal loyalty to Cortés, while others saw him as their best opportunity for enrichment. But from the outset of the campaign still other members of the Velázquez faction had voiced open opposition, insisting they be permitted to return to Cuba, where they would undoubtedly report to the governor. Cortés had cemented his authority among the rebels through a judicious mixture of force and persuasion.


But the problem arose again with the addition of Narváez's forces to the mix. While headquartered in Texcoco as his men made siege preparations along the lakeshore surrounding Tenochtitlan, Cortés uncovered an assassination plot hatched by Antonio de Villafaña, a personal friend of Velázquez. The plan was to stab the conquistador to death while he dined with his captains. Though Cortés had the names of a number of co-conspirators, he put only the ringleader on trial. Sentenced to death, Villafaña was promptly hanged from a window for all to see. Greatly relieved at having cheated death, the surviving conspirators went out of their way to demonstrate loyalty. Thus Cortés quelled the mutiny.

But hostility toward the conquistador and his "unlawful" expedition also brewed back home in the court of Spanish King and Holy Roman Emperor Charles V. In Cortés' absence his adversaries tried every means to undermine him, threatening his status as an agent of the crown and seeking to deny him the just fruits of his labors. The commander was forced to spend precious time, energy and resources fighting his diplomatic battle from afar. Even after successfully completing the conquest, Cortés received no quarter from his enemies, who accused him of both defrauding the crown of its rightful revenues and fomenting rebellion. On Dec. 2, 1547, the 62-year-old former conquistador died a wealthy but embittered man in Spain. At his request his remains were returned to Mexico.

Setting aside long-held preconceptions about the ease of the conquest of Mexico—which do disservice to both the Spanish commander and those he conquered—scholars of the period should rightfully add Cortés to the ranks of the great captains of war. For whatever advantages the Spaniards enjoyed, victory would have been impossible without his extraordinary leadership. As master of the conquest, Cortés demonstrated fixity of purpose, skilled diplomacy, talent for solving logistical problems, far-sighted planning, heroic battlefield command, tactical flexibility, iron determination and, above all, astounding audacity. MH

Justin D. Lyons is an assistant professor in the Department of History and Political Science at Ohio's Ashland University. For further reading he recommends Aztec Warfare: Imperial Expansion and Political Control, by Ross Hassig; The Spanish Invasion of Mexico 1519–1521, by Charles M. Robinson III; and Conquest: Cortés, Montezuma, and the Fall of Old Mexico, by Hugh Thomas.







ifty-six minutes after midnight on Jan. 17, 1991, four U.S. Air Force MH-53J Pave Low III special operations helicopters and nine Army AH-64A Apache attack helicopters began lifting off from Forward Operating Base Al Jouf in Saudi Arabia bound for two targets deep within Iraqi airspace. Countless hours of exhaustive training behind them, the success of the aviators' incipient mission hinged on every aspect of a highly choreographed operation falling into place at exactly the right moment—including the faultless operation of onboard global positioning systems that relied on satellites controlled from the other side of the world.

Their mission was the opening salvo of a coordinated aerial assault against the regime of Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi dictator had sent his armed forces into neighboring Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990, claiming the wealthy, oil-producing constitutional monarchy as Iraq's 19th province. Saddam had then further stoked the fires of international outrage by apparently readying his military for an invasion of Saudi Arabia—if successful, the move would have given Iraq's strongman control of nearly half of the world's known oil reserves, destabilizing the Persian Gulf region and disrupting the world economy.

The international response to Iraq's aggression was initially confined to diplomatic channels, the United Nations

and Arab League each condemning the invasion and calling for the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait. Next came economic sanctions and arms embargoes. The United States, while supporting such measures, took a harder line. Five days after Iraq's invasion—with the blessing of Saudi Arabia's King Fahd—President George H.W. Bush launched Operation Desert Shield, ordering American air and ground forces into Saudi Arabia to shore up the kingdom's defenses, and dispatching two U.S. Navy battle groups to the Persian Gulf in a show of force.

On November 29, given Saddam's stubborn refusal to pull his forces out of Kuwait and his increasingly bellicose threats toward Saudi Arabia and other states in the region, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 678, setting a Jan. 15, 1991, deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and authorizing the international community to use "all necessary means" to eject Saddam's troops from the tiny nation if those forces did not leave voluntarily.

It was, in effect, an authorization for war against Iraq.

Even as diplomatic efforts were under way, the United States spearheaded efforts to assemble an international military coalition for possible use against Saddam, with 34 nations—representing the largest coalition since World War II—ulti-



mately providing troops, military hardware and/or financial and logistical support. U.S. Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., the commander of coalition forces, ordered his planners to formulate an offensive to both reduce the risk of an Iraqi assault against Saudi Arabia and eject Saddam's forces from Kuwait. To do so, planners had to overcome a host of obstacles, including political and religious rivalries among member states, logistical and operational complications inherent in the conduct of a multinational campaign and the myriad challenges presented by mechanized desert warfare.

Planners presented Schwarzkopf with an initial draft of the coalition plan on August 10, just eight days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Code-named Operation Instant Thunder, it emphasized a massive air strike on the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, and the many fortified command bunkers of Saddam's military forces. Although the plan included an innovative and generally well-received operation to knock out Iraq's air defenses, it fell short in other areas. Among the main points of contention were the plan's assumption such strikes would induce an Iraqi withdrawal, and it failed to consider how Saddam's elite Republican Guard—omitted from the target list—would respond to a coalition attack. These and other shortcomings led to the plan being rejected in short order. On August 21 U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Charles Horner,

the Riyadh-based commander of coalition air operations, brought in Air Force Brig. Gen. Buster C. Glosson to revise the plan, giving him less than a week to prepare a briefing.

Glosson and his team worked around the clock from an office in the basement of the Royal Saudi Air Force building in Riyadh. In the days that followed Glosson's planning group

The planning group was dubbed the 'Black Hole,' as those who joined it never seemed to re-emerge

—dubbed the "Black Hole," as those who joined it never seemed to re-emerge—hammered out the basics of a four-phase strategic air campaign. The critical first phase called for a ground attack by special operations forces intended to destroy the radar sites in western Iraq.

Briefed on the plan on September 3, Schwarzkopf was initially impressed by Glosson's plan, but three weeks later planning came to an abrupt halt when a requisition for GPS-equipped ground vehicles arrived on Schwarzkopf's desk, igniting the general's fury. Glosson was immediately

summoned before an irate Schwarzkopf, who lambasted the notion of using special operations ground forces. A highly decorated foot soldier, Schwarzkopf had proven himself a resourceful and reliable combat leader in Vietnam. But it was also in Southeast Asia where a string of bad experiences with special operations forces had soured the general's opinion of such "hotshot" units, and Schwarzkopf made it abundantly clear he intended to keep their numbers as low as possible. He then nixed Phase I of Glosson's plan in its entirety.

The Air Force officer vanished back into the Black Hole, knowing the destruction of the Iraqi radar sites remained the essential prelude to any large-scale aerial assault on Saddam and his military forces. With the possibility of using ground troops off the table, the team considered the use of helicopters. In a matter of hours Glosson and his subordinates prepared an updated attack plan built around Army AH-64A Apaches, war machines equipped with almost everything necessary for a successful first strike, including firepower and the ability to photographically verify damage. But the Apaches lacked the navigation equipment necessary to guide them to and from their targets, so Glosson and his planners added Air Force MH-53J Pave Low IIIs to the mix. Equipped with new GPS receivers, the Pave Lows were capable of providing the pinpoint navigational accuracy the Apaches would require.

Glosson presented the revised plan to Schwarzkopf, detailing his reasoning for using the Pave Lows. Such a joint-forces operation, Glosson explained, would be more than

Destruction of the Iraqi radar sites remained the essential prelude to any large-scale aerial assault

capable of knocking a gaping hole in Iraq's air defense system, thereby paving the way for an aerial assault. The Air Force general also stressed that without the pairing of the Army and Air Force helicopters, the mission would be a no-go. Despite his distaste for anything labeled "special operations," Schwarzkopf saw Glosson's logic and approved the plan.

Saddam's army was the fourth largest in the world at the time, with nearly 1 million men under arms. The regime had long relied on the Soviet Union for materiel support, and its air defenses were built around various truck-mounted, Soviet-made surveillance and target-acquisition radars referred to in the West as "Flat Face," "Squat Eye" and "Spoon Rest." These radars controlled associated anti-aircraft gun and missile systems, forming a "picket fence" around Iraq. Glosson's plan called for three sites in western Iraq to be knocked out simultaneously in order to open a safe corridor for incoming coalition aircraft bound for Baghdad and other targets.

The mission was rife with complexity. The aircrews would be tasked with finding three electronically linked

sites roughly 70 miles apart, then wiping them out simultaneously and completely. Success hinged on timing and expertise—not to mention the element of surprise.

The AH-64As tapped to participate in the attack belonged to the Fort Campbell, Ky.—based 1st Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. Dick Cody. Part of the famed 101st Airborne Division, the battalion had chosen the motto, "Expect No Mercy," aptly reflecting the power of the aircraft the unit flew. With an arsenal that included AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, Hydra 70 rockets and a 30 mm M230 chain gun, the Apache had the firepower to obliterate its targets and the ability to verify their destruction.

Though seemingly ideal for the proposed mission, the AH-64s faced significant issues. To begin with, Apaches were notoriously high maintenance under even the best circumstances, every hour in the air requiring three hours of maintenance on the ground. For much of the year average high temperatures in the region hovered around 100 degrees, wreaking havoc with the helicopters' sensitive electronics and resulting in far lower mission-capable rates than those experienced in the United States. Moreover, fine, blowing sand scored the Apaches' rotor blades like razors, requiring ground crews to regularly repaint blades to counter its abrasive effects.

The AH-64s' relatively limited range (265 miles) was also a concern, in that without some way to top off their tanks, the attack helicopters wouldn't have the fuel to complete the mission—assuming they were able to find their targets in the first place. The Apaches' Doppler navigation attitude-heading reference system was useless in the flat, featureless terrain of the desert, for there was nothing for the Doppler waves to bounce off. Only one military helicopter in the theater could solve the navigation problem facing planners.


The Air Force MH-53J Pave Low III machines of Lt. Col. Richard Comer's 20th Special Operations Squadron had received extensive modifications in the late 1980s—including the installation of state-of-the-art global positioning systems. Although the navigation suite had never been used in combat, the Pave Lows were more than capable of guiding the Apaches to their targets. Moreover, the 20th SOS was the only unit in-theater with GPS capability.

While other operational issues remained, one of task force commander Cody's easiest decisions concerned what to call his joint Army—Air Force team. Recalling the way in which 101st Airborne troops and Army Air Forces aviators had worked together during the 1944 D-Day invasion, Cody made a logical choice—Task Force Normandy. The composite organization was divided into three teams, Red, White and Blue. Each would be assigned to eliminate one of three early warning radar sites, paving the way for the massive aerial assault on Baghdad.

In the closing months of 1990 the pilots of TF Normandy trained in remote areas of northern Saudi Arabia. As Iraqi operatives were monitoring coalition forces throughout the region, planners kept the training and details of the anti-radar









mission top secret. Operational specifics remained unknown even to the pilots, who regardless trained relentlessly, studying intel maps, photos and sandbox mock-ups of their targets.

Maintenance and engineering teams also kept busy. Despite the Apache's temperamental reputation and the extreme desert conditions, Cody's crew chiefs were able to maintain a daily aircraft-availability rate of 94 percent.

Working together, the pilots and maintenance crews addressed the problem of the Apache's range by adding a tear-shaped, 230-gallon external fuel tank beneath one of the Apache's two stub-wings. Balancing the asymmetrical configuration required placement of two quad Hellfire missile launchers on the wing's outer stores position, and a 19-round rocket launcher on the two inboard locations. The arrange-

Operation Eager Anvil

he clock started to tick for Saddam Hussein in late November 1990 when the U.N. Security Council set a Jan. 15, 1991, deadline for withdrawal of his occupation forces from Kuwait. By then U.S. officials had already begun to assemble an international military coalition and formulate plans for a combat operation to expel Saddam's forces. It would begin with a massive air campaign.

The most formidable obstacle facing planners was Iraq's extensive, sophisticated air defense network. If coalition aircraft were to knock out Saddam's warfighting capability, that network would have to go. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., the commander of coalition forces, ultimately greenlighted a proposal to have teams of assault helicopters destroy two key radar facilities, opening the door to Baghdad.

ALEPPO

SYRIA

Iraqi early-warning radar and SAM coverage

Objective NevadaJan. 17, 1991
02:38 hours

Objective CaliforniaJan. 17, 1991
02:38 hours

DAMASCUS

JORDAN

Team Red
Two Pave Low and four
Apache helicopters

Team WhiteTwo Pave Low and four
Apache helicopters

MH-53J Pave Low III

Task Force Normandy's four GPS-equipped Pave Lows guided the Apaches to their targets and then stood by in a search-and-rescue capacity.

> Task Force Normandy

Forward Operating
Base Al Jouf

AL JOUF

AH-64A Apache

Eight of these rotary-wing gunships hit the two Iraqi radar sites, destroying both targets with a rain of Hellfire missiles, Hydra rockets and gunfire.

Iraqi Air Defenses

By 1991 Saddam Hussein's Iraq boasted a robust air defense network of radar- and infrared-guided surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and more than 8,000 fixed and mobile anti-aircraft guns. Yet on that first night of Operation Desert Storm only one U.S. fighter, an F/A-18 Hornet flown by Navy Lt. Cmdr. Scott Speicher, was downed by enemy fire.



BAGHDAD

IRAN

NAJAF

IRAQ

Iraqi early-warning radar and SAM coverage PERSIAN GULF

KUWAIT

KUWAIT


Task Force Normandy

To carry out Eager Anvil, planners assembled two helicopter assault teams, each comprising two MH-53J Pave Low IIIs and four AH-64A Apaches. Lifting off from FOB Al Jouf around 1 a.m. on January 17, the teams flew to their respective targets in radio silence yet opened fire within seconds of one another, wholly destroying the radar sites.

Task Force Normandy refueling point

KING KHALID MILITARY CITY

SAUDI ARABIA



ment extended the aircraft's strike capability to more than 400 miles, allowing the Apaches up to 20 minutes at the targets, although the plan called for a quarter of that time.

Other vital details remained. As the U.N. deadline approached, planners ironed out the light signals used by the Pave Lows, required flying techniques and the speed and altitude at which the teams would fly. Meanwhile, the aircrews logged hundreds of miles, always at night and without communication, navigation or formation lights. A scant three-rotor disk radius separated them as they flew to their objectives, where old buses served as their targets. At the end of each practice run pilots reported the level of destruction achieved as "Charlie" (minimal damage), "Bravo" (partial destruction) or "Alpha" (total destruction). A review of the videotape after one live-fire training mission offered added assurance the Apaches had the firepower to finish the job—where the buses had been, only warped chunks of smoking metal remained.

By early December 1990 intelligence indicated the radar installation assigned to Team Blue wasn't linked to any airdefense operations centers, meaning the site need not be attacked. Rather than scrap a team, Cody assigned the Blue crews to Teams Red and White, though he continued to keep his men in the dark regarding mission details, including the location of the remaining targets, dubbed Objectives California and Nevada. Finally, just after Christmas, Desert Shield commander Schwarzkopf gave the mission the green light.

TF Normandy remained in northern Saudi Arabia for

reasons of both secrecy and security as the calendar turned to 1991. Another two weeks passed before the men and aircraft moved to Forward Operating Base Al Jouf, a desolate outpost in northwest Saudi Arabia comprising a small fuel depot and single-strip runway. Even then the move was executed covertly. When they landed to refuel en route at King Khalid Military City, not even the ground crew at that site was privy to their mission. The task force aircraft blended in seamlessly with the other helicopters operating out of the complex.

When the U.N.'s January 15 deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait passed without action by Saddam, war became a certainty. That very day Cody and Comer finally briefed their pilots on mission specifics, distributing up-to-date maps and photos of the targets in astounding detail—so clear, aircrews quipped, that they determined a stray dog at Objective California

to be male and jokingly nicknamed him Jamal.

At about 2 p.m. on January 16 Task Force Normandy received the terse order, "Wolfpack Execute Mission." H-Hour—the commencement of Operation Desert Storm—was set at 3 a.m. on the 17th, which meant the first of the two groups, Team White, would lift off at 12:56 a.m., followed

five minutes later by Team Red. If all went according to plan, both teams would arrive at their destinations at exactly 2:38 a.m. In all four Pave Lows, nine Apaches (one in reserve), two Navy HH-60H Sea Hawks and two Air Force MH-60G Pave Hawks lifted off from Al Jouf. The Pave Lows carried Air Force pararescue jumpers in case an aircraft went down in the target area, while the Sea Hawks and Pave Hawks remained on standby in Saudi airspace, ready to recover crews from any aircraft downed en route.

The aircraft of TF Normandy flew to their targets 50 feet off the ground at 138 mph, in total radio silence and zero illumination. The GPS system on which they relied not only hadn't been used in combat, but also was dependent on a handful of satellites controlled from Colorado Springs, Colo. As the nascent GPS satellite network remained incomplete, the MH-53s could obtain accurate navigational fixes only during specific time windows, further restricting mission parameters. The Pave Lows weren't the only ones depending on Colorado Springs controllers. As TF Normandy closed on its targets, seven Air Force B-52G bombers were also in the air, on a nonstop flight from Barksdale Air Force Base outside Shreveport, La., preparing to launch 35 GPS-guided cruise missiles at targets in northern Iraq.

Shortly after crossing into Iraq, the aviators of Team White watched as the sky below and in front of them lit up with small-arms tracers. Cody, flying one of the lead aircraft, surmised soldiers on the ground had heard the inbound helicopters and blindly fired into the night sky. Had the mission been compromised, they'd know soon enough.

To help the Apaches navigate during their final approach, the Pave Lows would drop green infrared chemical lights at preset points 9 miles from each target. Visible only through night-vision goggles and forward-looking infrared sensors, the chem lights would enable the Apaches to update their attitude-heading reference systems and remain on course. Right on cue, 90 minutes into the mission, the Pave Low escorts dropped their chem sticks on the reference points and then veered off as the Apache crews updated their nav systems and closed on their respective targets.

The AH-64As moved into firing position and turned on their ranging lasers within seconds of the 2:38 a.m. attack time, and the lead pilot broke radio silence: "Party in 10!"

Ten seconds later the gunners opened fire. Twenty seconds after that a barrage of detonating Hellfire missiles engulfed the radar installations, lighting up the desert for miles around. Once those were depleted, the Apaches closed in, continuing their rain of destruction with a torrent of flesh-rending Hydra rockets and bursts of 30 mm cannon fire. Although the teams had been allotted five minutes to finish the job, eradication of the targets took less than four.

One task remained: The Apaches hovered over the installations and filmed the destruction. What hadn't exploded in a fireball had been reduced to rubble, including every targeted piece of equipment and every human onsite. Only





Jamal the dog had survived, bolting into the desert at the first blast. As the Apaches turned toward their rendezvous point, their crews radioed ahead to the Pave Lows with news of the mission's success:

"California. Alpha, Alpha."

"Nevada. Alpha, Alpha."

The joint Army—Air Force mission had punched a massive hole in Iraq's air-defense system, and as the Task Force Normandy teams approached the border, they could see a constellation of flashing beacons as the first wave of strike aircraft passed overhead, flying undetected and unopposed to their targets. Operation Eager Anvil—a mission that on several occasions had seemed destined to disappear into the Black Hole—ushered in a new era of technologically advanced warfare. In the short term the new way of warfighting would prompt Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, while in the longer term it would lay the groundwork for the "shock and awe" attacks that opened Operation Iraqi Freedom a dozen years later. MH

Freelance writer Beth Underwood has contributed to numerous newspapers and magazines. For further reading she recommends Airpower Advantage: Planning the Gulf War Air Campaign, 1989–1991, by Diane T. Putney; Beyond Hell and Back: How America's Special Operations Forces Became the World's Greatest Fighting Unit, by Dwight Jon Zimmerman and John D. Gresham; and Lightning: The 101st in the Gulf War, by Lt. Gen. Edward M. Flanagan Jr.



Wu Qi, who led the armies of three Chinese kingdoms in upward of 80 battles, experienced defeat only off the battlefield By Tang Long

ost military historians consider the strategist Sun-tzu the premier general of ancient China. But many Chinese in the know rate Wu Qi (440–381 Bc), a less renowned contemporary of Suntzu, a superior commander—and Wu Qi boasts the record to back that reputation.

In his lifetime Wu Qi's many character flaws contravened the traditional Chinese image of an iconic hero. He was vain, avaricious, lecherous, ambitious and unlucky. Thus, Confucian scholars paid him little regard, which explains the paucity of written material and resultant lack of knowledge about him, both in China and abroad. But his personal failings should not detract from his undisputed status as an exceptional military leader.

Wu Qi lived during the beginning of the fractious Warring States period (475–221 BC). As a young man he demonstrated few notable attributes, preferred swordplay to scholarship and associated with local ruffians. His despairing mother often chastised the errant boy for his misdeeds.

One day, after another round of sharp rebukes from his mother, Wu Qi bit into the bicep of his own arm and swore a solemn oath by his blood: "I am leaving and shall not return until I have made a name for myself and come home in a carriage with riches and honor." He traveled east to the Lu kingdom, homeland of the renowned philosopher Confucius, and entered the school of Confucian disciple Tseng Tzu.

Wu Qi's determination to improve himself soon paid unexpected dividends when Tian Ghu, a minister of the neighboring Qi kingdom, happened to visit Master Tseng's

Wu Qi visited the court and presented the severed head of his wife as a testament of loyalty

school. At the end of the visit Minister Tian, obviously struck by Wu Qi's demeanor and intelligence, promised one of his daughters to Wu Qi as a wife, an offer the aspiring young scholar readily accepted. After Tian departed, Master Tseng summoned Wu Qi to learn more about his student's family background. But the schoolmaster's congenial curiosity turned to rage when he learned of the blood oath Wu Qi had sworn before his mother, a disrespectful deed that violated the central Confucian tenet of filial loyalty to one's parents.

Not long afterward a messenger brought word Wu Qi's mother had died. On hearing the news, Wu Qi lifted his head and howled three tearful cries to heaven, then wiped dry his tears and resumed his studies. He would not return home to perform the funeral rites and mourn, as expected of a son. When Master Tseng learned of Wu Qi's reaction, he was incensed the young man had so little regard for his late mother and expelled Wu Qi from the school. In frustration Wu Qi promptly abandoned his classical studies to pursue the art of war. Three years later he presented his credentials to Kung-yi Tzu, prime minister of Lu. Lord Kung-yi remembered Wu Qi not only as an exceptional student in Master Tseng's school, but also as the son-in-law of a minister in the powerful Qi kingdom to the north.

Wu Qi sufficiently impressed Lord Kung-yi with his knowledge of military doctrine and leadership techniques. Lord Kung-yi in turn persuaded Duke Mu, ruler of Lu, to appoint Wu Qi a minister of the court. The new courtier wasted no time in acquiring several concubines, as befitting a person of his rank and social status.

Even as Wu Qi settled in to enjoy his newfound status, trouble was brewing in neighboring Qi, where Prime Minister Tian He sought to usurp the throne. Duke Mu of Lu was related by marriage to the deposed king of Qi, and Tian feared he would contest the coup d'état. The new ruler of Qi sent an army to preempt a possible Lu attempt to restore the old king.

Duke Mu wanted Wu Qi to drive off the invaders but hesitated because Wu Qi was related by marriage to the new ruler of Qi. The duke discussed his concerns regarding Wu Qi with his prime minister, who relayed the duke's reservations to Wu Qi. The next day Wu Qi visited the court and presented the severed head of his wife to the duke as a testament of loyalty. The horrified duke waved off the macabre trophy but promptly gave Wu Qi command of the army.

Wu Qi's leadership style at first surprised and then endeared him to his troops. Instead of riding in the command chariot, he walked alongside his men. He carried his own rations and equipment on the march, while in camp he ate with his soldiers and slept on the ground like them. With those simple deeds the young general gained the steadfast loyalty and respect of his men.

The advance of Wu Qi's army did not go unnoticed, of course. Spies from Qi shadowed the oncoming troops, reporting their position and weaponry to Tian He. The lord and commander of the Qi army ridiculed Wu Qi's leadership style. "Although he is a son-in-law of my clan," he told advisers, "the man indulges too much in pretty women and lacks military experience. The Lu army shall be defeated."





Wu Qi halted his army a short distance from the Qi hordes, making no move to provoke a battle. Surprised at his opponent's inaction, Tian He sent spies to scout out the Lu encampment. From cover the spies watched as Wu Qi sat on the ground and shared porridge with a group of common soldiers. On hearing the report, Tian He sneered: "Familiarity breeds contempt. A general should demonstrate his elite status and superiority to the men to command their respect, so they will be obedient and fight hard for him. Wu Qi obviously does not understand the basic tenets of command leadership. I am not worried about the outcome of the coming battle."

Tian He then sent his commander to the Lu encampment under the pretext of peace negotiations in order to report on the enemy's preparedness and intentions. Grasping the true reason for the visit, Wu Qi hid his best troops from view while parading old men before his visitor. He treated the envoy with extreme courtesy, and though outwardly reciprocal the Qi commander scrupulously noted the Lu army's disposition before returning to his own camp—oblivious to the three columns of Wu Qi's troops who trailed him.

The Qi commander told his king the Lu army was full of weak old men. His report, coupled with Tian He's belief Wu Qi was not a military leader to be reckoned with, prompted the duo to drop their guard. Thus the Qi army was wholly unprepared when the Lu columns sprang the trap, and Wu Qi and his men quickly dominated the field. When the Lu

By hiding the best of his Lu troops from a snooping enemy envoy, Wu Qi lulled Tian He into complacency, then sprang the trap on the Qi army.

army returned in triumph to the capital of Qufu, the elated Duke Mu rewarded Wu Qi with promotion to senior minister.

Duke Mu was not the only noble impressed by Wu Qi's victory. Back in the Qi capital of Linze, Tian He himself lamented: "Wu Qi is obviously a general that is an equal to Sun-tzu. As long as that man serves the Lu kingdom, we are at risk. I want someone to go and negotiate terms with him." To regain favor in the royal court, the disgraced Qi commander volunteered for the duty. Disguised as a merchant, he set out for Wu Qi's residence accompanied by two beautiful concubines and bearing a small fortune of 1,000 taels. Wu Qi accepted the women and treasure in exchange for a reciprocal promise not to invade the Qi kingdom if it did not attack the Lu.

On leaving the city the duplicitous Qi commander intentionally leaked word of the bribe, and rumors of a backroom pact between Wu Qi and the ruler of the rival Qi state quickly reached the Lu court. The already paranoid Duke Mu immediately had Lord Kung-yi executed for sponsoring Wu Qi into the court, then sent men to arrest the reportedly upstart general. Forewarned of his peril, Wu Qi abandoned his newfound riches and fled to Anyi, capital of the Wei kingdom. There he found refuge with an official in the royal court. In



that tumultuous period Lord Wen of Wei needed a competent commander to guard the West River territories—a key region that bordered the powerful Qin kingdom—and the official presented Wu Qi as the ideal candidate. Wen agreed, appointing the new arrival governor-general of the West River region.

Wu Qi quickly began construction of a powerful frontier post, which grew into the city of Wucheng (in present-day Shaanxi). He also went on the offensive. When Duke Hui, ruler of neighboring Qin, died, Wu Qi used the political instability to capture five cities from that nation. During the ensuing years of warfare he kept the West River region secure and prosperous, blocking Qin's eastward expansion.

Wu Qi's success owed much to his celebrated regard for those who served him. He continued to share his troops' burdens in the field, while also working to professionalize his army. To that end he established a system for identifying and then training outstanding soldiers for what he termed an "elite warrior corps." Unit members reputedly had to be able to draw a heavy crossbow with an 800-pound pull and complete a 30-mile half-day march in full armor carrying a crossbow, quiver with 50 bolts, halberd, sword and three day's rations.

Wu Qi gave his elite warriors preferential treatment, freeing them from paying taxes and exempting their families from labor levies to the realm. That said, the general did subject them to strict and often extreme discipline. An account from one battle is particularly illustrative. At the onset of the fight an elite warrior charged without orders and succeeded in disrupting the enemy formation, his action providing an opening for Wu Qi to secure victory. Afterward, the soldier brought forth enemy heads he had taken to claim his reward. Instead of praising the man, however, Wu Qi had him arrested. "You are a brave warrior," the general told him.





"Your individual initiative contributed to our victory. But you acted without orders, which is a capital offense. For that you shall die. However, rest assured, your family will be well taken care of." Wu Qi then had the soldier beheaded.

During his tenure in the West River region Wu Qi fought 76 campaigns and won 64 victories, without a single defeat.

When Lord Wen died in 396 BC, his son, Lord Wu, became ruler of Wei, and Wu Qi returned from the West River to attend the ceremony. Unfortunately, during the course of the opulent pageant the general's glaring character flaws—namely pride and arrogance—again reared their heads.

The problem arose from Wu Qi's belief his accomplishments as governor-general had earned him the right to be prime minister of Wei. However, Lord Wu gave the post to Tian Wen, prompting Wu Qi to storm angrily from the royal

Under suspicion of treachery, Wu Qi fled from Lu to Wei, whose lord appointed him governor-general of the West River region. There he built a powerful frontier post, which grew into the city of Wucheng.

court. He vented his frustration about the slight to anyone who would listen and then went a step further, directly confronting Prime Minister Tian, the man who had "stolen" his rightful post. When Lord Wu heard of the confrontation, he stripped the general of command, though he did allow Wu Qi to host annual military banquets for his former troops.

At the banquets soldiers with significant combat honors sat in the prestigious front tier, those with minor honors in the second tier, and those who had won no honors in the last tier. Parents of those honored received special recognition and rewards for the deeds of their sons, while emissaries from Lord Wu also distributed gifts to families of troops killed in

action. As Wu Qi had likely hoped, the gatherings kept both the morale of his elite forces high and his own name foremost in the minds of senior Wei leaders. Finally, in 389 BC, when the Qin kingdom attacked the West River territory with a half-million men, Lord Wu tapped Wu Qi to spearhead its defense. Choosing 50,000 of his elite warriors—all from the third tier and hungry for battle honors—the general marched them toward Yangjin, which was under siege by Qin troops.

As his men prepared for battle, Wu Qi exhorted them, saying, "An infantryman must take down an enemy infantryman, a charioteer must capture an enemy chariot, and a cavalryman must bring back a counterpart of the enemy; otherwise, there will be no battle honors for you, even if we defeat the enemy." The general then took advantage of the windy, moonless night to slip his army up behind the enemy. Launching a swift and brutal attack, Wu Qi and his men soon routed the vastly larger enemy army.

One might expect Wu Qi's decisive victory at Yangjin to

have elevated his estimation in the eyes of the Wei royal court, but intrigue was to once again derail his political ambitions.



Gong was married to a Wei princess, and he suggested to Lord Wu that the king marry off Wu Qi to another of his daughters as a way to ensure the general's loyalty to the realm. Lord Wu agreed, and Gong invited Wu Qi to a banquet at which he would ostensibly introduce the general to the perfect future wife. However, during the festivities the prime minister intentionally provoked the woman into a tirade in front of his guests. As expected, Wu Qi—appalled at the woman's behavior and fearing a shrewish wife would harm his honor and public reputation—turned down Lord Wu's prestigious offer of a royal marriage. As Gong had hoped, Wu Qi's refusal caused Lord Wu to doubt the general's fealty.

Having fallen afoul of yet another royal court, Wu Qi again had to leave his hard-earned wealth and position and flee. Though his resume was impressive, his prospects were dim, for he had led armies against the powerful Qin and Qi kingdoms, and all other states but Chu, to the south, were weaker than Wei. For once fortune smiled on Wu Qi, as King Dao of Chu had profound respect for the general's accomplishments and soon appointed him prime minister.

Wu Qi finally had his chance to implement the nationbuilding ideas that had long occupied his thoughts. With



King Dao's full support he developed and implemented a grand strategy for the transformation of the kingdom's government and the military. To start with he dismissed hundreds of extraneous courtiers and clamped down on bribery and influence peddling among his senior officials and their staff. Royal relations more than five steps removed from the king lost their stipends and had to seek their own means of subsistence, while the stipends of all other relations were staggered according to their genetic proximity to the ruler. Aristocrats who had inherited their positions through more than three generations were stripped of their titles.

Such measures dramatically reduced expenditures, sparking immediate improvement in the kingdom's finances. Wu Qi used some of the funds to better feed and prepare the kingdom's military forces. The general personally reviewed his troops' performance and capabilities, and he regularly promoted men of skill and talent, encouraging other eager warriors to join the Chu army. Soon enough, as Wu Qi promised, neighboring kingdoms regarded Chu with trepidation and respect, and not one hostile army threatened Chu's border during the remainder of King Dao's reign.

Unfortunately for Wu Qi, King Dao died within a few years of the reformation. A group of dispossessed former

More Writer Than Warrior

Though widely regarded as one of history's top military theorists, Suntzu himself saw little if any combat. Wu Qi, on the other hand, led the armies of three kingdoms, participated in some 80 battles and was never defeated in the field. One Chinese version of *The Art of War* even includes Wu Qi's military theories.





officials and royal relatives took the occasion of their sovereign's death to launch an immediate court revolt. They chased Wu Qi into the royal palace, where King Dao's body lay in state. Wu Qi sought refuge behind his lord's body as the rebels unleashed a flight of arrows, several of which hit the royal corpse. Riddled with arrows and dying, Wu Qi got the last word. "I may die now," he cried, "but all of you will soon follow me. You have desecrated the king's body and shall pay for the crime with your own lives and that of your families." True to Wu Qi's words, King Sheng, Dao's son and successor, tracked down all who had participated in the rebellion, more than 70 in all, and had them executed.

While unquestionably a brilliant strategist, Sun-tzu's fame rests primarily on his treatise *The Art of War*. But history records only one battle in which the military thinker may have taken part, while Wu Qi led troops for three kingdoms, fought some 80 battles and remained undefeated on the field. Even Sun-tzu's famed treatise has benefitted from Wu Qi's hands-on experience, one Chinese version including the latter's military theories in the latter part of the text.

Yet although Wu Qi recorded far greater military accomplishments than most of his peers, Chinese historians have relegated him to a minor role. That is partly because his

Following his ouster from the kingdom of Wei, Wu Qi put his skills as a politician and military leader to work for King Dao of Chu, turning the monarch's once feeble army into a dominant military power.

obvious character flaws contradict the Confucian ideals that have long dominated Chinese society. A vain, greedy and ambitious man who swore a blood oath against his own mother and murdered his wife to advance his career was certainly not worth of Confucian scholarly acclaim.

How far might Wu Qi have risen? Given his gifts as a military commander and the fact that the Chu kingdom had more territory, resources and soldiers (more than 1 million men) than its neighbors, he might well have been able to vanquish the other kingdoms and unite China under the Chu banner. Given his ambitious nature, Wu Qi might have become the Julius Caesar of the Far East—had it not been for the personal failings that kept the crown from his head. MH

Tang Long (aka William Tang) is a retired U.S. intelligence officer. He is fluent in three Chinese dialects, has taught collegelevel Chinese history and wrote the "Tales of the Dragon" column for The Washington Times. For further reading he recommends Romance of the Three Kingdoms, by Luo Guanzhong, and Chinese Strategists, by Ooi Kee Beng.

FROILINE FOR STATE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROP

Photographer Horst Faas took risks on and off the battlefield to publish stark images of war in Southeast Asia

By Deborah Stadtler

Faas focused on troops of the 2nd Battalion, 173rd Airborne Brigade, as they crossed a road while under sniper fire near Ben Binh, South Vietnam, in June 1965.




orst Faas was among the best known of the photographers who risked their lives to capture the gritty reality of the Vietnam War. Combat photography had made its debut during the 1853–56 Crimean War. By World War I cameras had become small enough to be carried into battle, and throughout the 20th century front-line images contributed to the public understanding of war. The emerging popularity of television in the 1960s enabled networks to beam images from Vietnam into Americans' very living rooms.

Born in Berlin in 1933, Faas fell into a job as a photographer in postwar Germany. He joined the Associated Press in 1956 and by 1962 was the AP's chief photographer in Southeast Asia. He won a 1965 Pulitzer Prize for his Vietnam images. After being severely wounded by an incoming rocket-propelled grenade, Faas largely gave up fieldwork for an assignment desk, from which he built a stable of young Vietnamese photographers and steered publication of many notable images of the war.

Faas was responsible for publishing Eddie Adams' shocking snapshot of a South Vietnamese police chief executing a Vietcong prisoner, as well as Nick Ut's Pulitzer-winning image of a naked Vietnamese girl fleeing a napalm attack on her village. He realized the photos were graphic, yet his decision to send them over the wire cemented their place, and his, in history.

"I don't think we influenced the [Vietnam] war at any time," Faas said. His mission, as he saw it, was to "record the suffering, the emotions and the sacrifices of both Americans and Vietnamese in...this little bloodstained country so far away." Faas—who'd beaten the odds in combat—died at age 79 in Munich on May 10, 2012. **MH**







A crewman from a downed CH-21 Shawnee "flying banana" troop helicopter flees for safety outside the village of Ca Mau, South Vietnam, in 1962. Though the Shawnee had collided with another helicopter, there were no serious injuries. Their crews destroyed both helicopters to keep them out of enemy hands.

B Troop-carrying UH-1 Iroquois helicopters approach a "hot" landing zone in advance of a ground attack on an enemy position near the Cambodian border northwest of Saigon. The March 1965 combined assault engaged Viet Cong forces camped near Tay Ninh.

A South Vietnamese medic sprints into a rice paddy under fire from Viet Cong guerrillas to aid wounded fellow soldiers. Faas captured the man's courageous, selfless act during an August 1966 firefight at the Plain of Reeds, west of Saigon.

D Men of the Seventh Fleet's special landing team—the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines—seek cover on a trail just south of the demilitarized zone before responding to sniper fire with a 3.5-inch rocket launcher. The action came during Operation Prairie in September 1966.

- In the Mekong Delta village of Cai Lay on April 21, 1967, a 9th Infantry Division military policeman plays with smiling local children. Such lighthearted moments were rare for Faas, who more often flirted with frontline death.
- F Bystanders rush to aid the injured after a March 30, 1965, car-bomb explosion on the streets outside the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. Faas' willingness to capture such graphic images pushed the boundaries of war coverage.
- G South Vietnamese children cling to their mothers while gazing up at a 173rd Airborne paratrooper holding a grenade launcher. The Americans were sweeping the Bao Trai area for Viet Cong in 1966 when they came under sniper fire.





South Vietnamese troops and their American advisers near Binh Gia in 1965 bask in the sunlight after a cold night spent anticipating an ambush. Shortly after posing for Faas, they moved out to continue hunting enemy guerrillas.

A Vietnamese litter bearer wears a scarf to mask the smell of the dead following a Nov. 27, 1965, firefight at the Michelin rubber plantation, 45 miles northeast of Saigon. A staging area for the Viet Cong, the plantation was the scene of many wartime clashes.

J U.S. infantrymen pause to remember fellow soldiers who died in the 1965 firefight at the Michelin plantation, during which Viet Cong troops overran a regiment of South Vietnamese troops and their advisers.

Betrayed by his native Athens, statesman and general Alcibiades took advantage of the shifting Aegean alliances first to seek revenge and then to finagle a glorious return to his homeland. It proved a short-lived redemption.

BEWARE THE FUREES

The fortunes of war are hardest on the vanquished, but for a cadre of Athenian commanders during the Peloponnesian War, victory proved fatal By Thomas Zacharis





resent-day Greece may be beset with problems, but the nation is stable in comparison to its tenure as a conglomeration of city-states, when the cradle of civilization was riven by civil strife. The pivot point in the struggle for regional dominance came during the 431–404 BC Peloponnesian War, which pitted the ascendant Delian League of city-states under Athens against the Peloponnesian League under Sparta. Their rivalry had its roots in the early 5th century BC wars with Mediterranean rival Persia.

Persian King Cyrus the Great had conquered the coastal city-states of Ionia (on the present-day Anatolian Peninsula of Turkey) in 547 BC, ruling them through despotic local satraps. In 499 BC one of the Ionian tyrants led an ultimately unsuccessful revolt against Persian rule with primary support from Athens. Seven years later Persia's King Darius I led a punitive expedition against Greece, specifically targeting the rebellious city-states of Athens and Sparta, each of which had executed Persian envoys sent to demand their submission. In 490 BC the Athenians won their stunning victory over superior Persian forces at Marathon.

Ten years later Darius' son and successor Xerxes I launched a second invasion of Greece. The Greek city-states largely banded together to defeat the Persians, but in the wake of their victory Spartan general Pausanias betrayed sympathies for Persia, releasing prisoners with personal ties to Xerxes and offering to deliver the city-states into Persian hands in exchange for the hand of Xerxes' daughter. His treason alienated many of the allied city-states, and Sparta was reluctant to continue what it saw as an unwinnable war against Persia. It withdrew from the alliance and reformed its regional Peloponnesian League, while many of the other city-states coalesced around Athens, forming the Delian League. Over the following decades Athens went on the offensive against Persia and solidified its hold on the Aegean, while Sparta withdrew further into the Peloponnese. The onetime Greek alliance broke down into a standoff between mutually suspicious and increasingly hostile leagues. "The growth of the power of Athens," wrote Greek historian Thucydides, "and the alarm which this inspired in [Sparta], made war inevitable."

The Peloponnesian War opened as Athens and Sparta sought to shore up their respective leagues and woo neutral city-states to their cause. A tenuous peace lasted until 431 BC, when Athens intervened in a clash between Spartan-allied Corinth and Megara, breaking the terms of the peace and prompting Sparta to rally its member states into conflict with Athens. Spartan strategy focused on occupation of the land surround-

ing Athens followed by a siege of the city, while Athenian strategy relied on its dominance of the sea routes. Initially, neither could gain the upper hand. It was an ostensible Athenian ally that planted the seed for a change in Spartan tactics.

At the Olympiad of 428 BC ambassadors from Mytilene, which hoped to wrest control of its home island of Lesbos in the northeastern Aegean, sought help from Sparta and Boeotia in its planned revolt against Athens. The Mytileneans urged the Spartans to choke off Athens at the source of her strength —that is, the Hellespont (present-day Dardanelles), its supply route for Crimean grain. Athens put down the revolt before the admittedly reluctant Spartans could send support, but Sparta filed away the advice regarding the Hellespont. In the meantime, after a decade of costly seesaw battles, the beleaguered leagues signed another tentative peace in 421 BC that, aside from minor probing battles, lasted some six years.

Athens faced perhaps a greater threat from fractures within its aristocratic ruling class, divisions that flared up in 415 BC at the outset of a campaign against Spartan-allied Syracuse and its allies on Sicily. The leading voices were the elder dovish Nicias, who had brokered the latest peace with Sparta, and the younger hawkish Alcibiades, who pointed to Athens' past supremacy in his appeal for an expedition to Sicily. Alcibiades proved more persuasive before the Athenian Assembly.

On the eve of the campaign, however, someone mutilated statues of Hermes, messenger of the gods, throughout Athens. Alcibiades' political opponents accused him of the vandalism and of profaning the sacred rites of the Eleusinian Mysteries. Alcibiades demanded an immediate trial, but his opponents shrewdly argued for a postponement, then sought to have him arrested on arrival in Sicily. Alcibiades slipped their noose but was convicted in absentia, condemned and stripped of all property. A man without a country, he defected to Sparta and watched the Sicilian campaign unfold. When his former men-at-arms moved on Messina, expecting internal allies to hand over the city-state, Alcibiades warned the Syracusans and prevented its capture. Sparta thwarted an initial Athenian siege of Syracuse, while the overcautious Nicias threw away a second abortive siege in 413 BC, surrendered his invasion force and was summarily executed.

Alcibiades, meanwhile, advised the Spartans to put the Athenians on the defensive by maintaining a year-round base at Decelea in Attica, within sight of Athens' walls. In a show of force the Spartans then sent him with a fleet to Anatolia, where he persuaded Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap of Lydia and Caria, to financially support the Peloponnesian League and encouraged several Ionian city-states to rebel. So close to the Hellespont, the Persian-funded fleet constituted a terrible threat, and Athens reacted swiftly, sending its own fleet to bring Chios and other city-states back into alignment.



The dominant warship in ancient Greece, the trireme was a galley that used oars as its primary means of propulsion. As suggested by its name, the trireme had three banks of oars with one man per oar, or about 170 rowers.


Even as he shored up political relations with his new Spartan allies, Alcibiades' passions collided with his ambitions. The decisive split came in 412 BC when Timaea, wife of Spartan King Agis II, gave birth to a son who looked suspiciously like the young Athenian commander—enough to prompt Agis to order the latter's assassination. Finding himself once more on the run, Alcibiades sought refuge in Tissaphernes' court. There the silver-tongued, two-time traitor soon convinced the satrap that the continued depletion of *both* Greek factions was in Persia's interest. The equally ambitious and self-serving Tissaphernes promptly withdrew his support of the Spartan fleet by refusing to reinforce it and canceling a promised pay increase to Peloponnesian crewmen.

Meanwhile, in Athens, playing on general discontent with the course of the war, ambitious aristocrats had seized power, rewriting the constitution and replacing the democratic parliament with an oligarchy of 400 chosen elites. To sway the populace into compliance, the oligarchs then

pledged to appoint a broader oligarchy of 5,000 Athenian citizens—in fact chosen from among their fellow aristocrats.

If they were to succeed, the oligarchs also had to secure the support of the Athenian army and fleet on Samos in the north Aegean. Not by coincidence, Alcibiades—who by then envisioned a glorious return to favor in Athens—was already in contact with the commanders on Samos when debate arose over whether to support the oligarchy. Seeing an even greater prize in reach, he curried favor with generals Thrasybullus and Thrasyllus, who had resolved to adhere to the ideal of Athenian democracy while continuing the fight against Sparta, independent of the oligarchy in Athens. Alcibiades, with empty promises of Tissaphernes' materiel support, convinced the troops on Samos to reinstate him as a general.

The main Athenian fleet, under Thrasybullus and Thrasyllus, then sailed north to confront the Spartans in the Hellespont. In 411 BC the Greeks prevailed at Abydos, thanks to timely reinforcement by a force of 18 triremes under Alcibiades. When the Spartans complained to Tissaphernes regarding the satrap's lack of support, he made a show of having Alcibiades imprisoned, though the Athenian commander soon "escaped." In the absence of the promised Per-



sian support, the Athenians were forced to regroup, and the Spartans soon took the Hellespont port of Cyzicus. Despite his loss of face Alcibiades managed to hang on to his command, and in 410 BC he earned redemption by helping to annihilate the Peloponnesian fleet at Cyzicus and retake the city, killing the Spartan admiral, Mindarus, in the bargain. Alcibiades followed up that victory in 408 BC with his participation in the successful siege of Byzantium (present-day Istanbul). The Hellespont was again under Athenian control.

With that string of victories under his belt Alcibiades finally sailed to the Athenian port of Piraeus in 407 BC. Citizens gave the once disgraced general a hero's welcome, and the reinstated democratic Assembly also rallied around him, restoring his property and proclaiming him *strategos autokrator*, supreme commander of all land and sea forces.

Alcibiades' long-standing dream of becoming the parliamentary dictator of Athens looked within reach. But his erstwhile allies, Sparta and Persia, were on the move.

In 407 BC, as Alcibiades basked in glory in Athens, Sparta appointed the seasoned veteran Lysander admiral of its fleet, while Cyrus the Younger, a son of Persian King Darius II,

was named satrap of Lydia. Cyrus favored the Spartans, as he envisioned using their infantry in his future plans to seize the throne of Persia from his brother Artaxerxes II. With Cyrus' money Lysander raised a new fleet at Ephesus, lured away many of the Athenians' best helmsmen and sailed out to meet and defeat Alcibiades' waiting fleet at Notium. Alcibiades had neglectfully left the fleet in command of his helmsman, and the *strategos autokrator*'s enemies wasted no time in stripping him of his title and ousting him permanently from favor. The Athenians replaced him with an experienced commander named Conon.

In Lysander he faced a formidable adversary. Determined to win, the Spartan admiral understood what statesmen back home could not—that Persia kept a hand in the war only to maintain its bridgeheads in the Aegean and the Hellespont. Thus, like Cyrus, he maintained the diplomatic façade as long as it served Sparta's purposes. Yet despite his obvious fitness for command, Lysander, too, soon lost his position, as Spartan law forbade an admiral from serving more than a year. Thus in 406 BC Callicratidas took his place as commander of the Spartan fleet. He was a poor choice.

A Spartan traditionalist, he was loath to seek support from the "barbarian" Cyrus and soon alienated the Persian satrap. More diplomat than commander, Callicratidas preferred to re-establish peace with Athens and was correspondingly reluctant to seek out and destroy its fleet. Instead he moved to secure Lesbos and thus reapply pressure on the Athenian supply lines. That spring he took the coastal city-state of Methymna and sent the disembarked Spartan army marching on the capital of Mytilene. He then led his fleet of 170 galleys against Conon, who had arrived off Lesbos with 70 galleys and anchored amid the Hekatonisa, or Hundred Islands (the present-day Ayvalik Islands of Turkey). Conon initially sought to outmaneuver and attack the superior Spartan fleet, but he lost 30 vessels in the attempt and was soon trapped in the port of Mytilene with his remaining 40 ships. Blockaded by sea and besieged by land, Conon dispatched two messenger galleys, one of which made it through the Spartan encirclement and three days later arrived at Piraeus. Though strapped for resources, the Athenian Assembly reacted immediately, melting down sacred statues into coins to fund the construction

As Alcibiades basked in glory in Athens, Sparta appointed the seasoned Lysander admiral

of a relief fleet and extending citizenship to foreign sailors and freed slaves needed to man the dozens of new ships.

Within weeks a fleet of 110 triremes set sail for Samos, where they joined 10 Athenian galleys and 30 allied ships. The combined fleet soon arrived at the Arginusae (the present-day Garip Islands off Turkey's Dikili Peninsula), 9 miles southeast

of Cape Malea on Lesbos. Athens had placed the relief fleet under the joint command of eight generals, each with his own approach. Seeking to immediately relieve Conon, one commander had rushed toward Mytilene with his division, only to come under attack in the channel and lose 10 of his dozen ships. Callicratidas, meanwhile, had learned of the Athenians' approach. Leaving 50 galleys under the command of Eteonicus to pin Conon in place, he deployed his fleet off Cape Malea facing the Arginusae. Spotting fires ashore, he surmised the Athenians had disembarked, thus he decided to launch a surprise attack. Bad weather stayed his hand until morning.

At dawn the respective fleets advanced on one another across the channel between Lesbos and the Arginusae.

The Athenian fleet approached with 90 ships in its first line, and 30 ships on each flank in a second line. The first line comprised the divisions of Aristocrates, Diomedon, Protomachus and Thrasyllus, the 10 galleys from Samos and the allied galleys with the flagships. Backing them on the left were Pericles and Erasinides, on the right Lysias and Aristogenes. Should the faster Spartan ships attempt to maneuver between vessels in the first line, triremes from the second line would move up to intercept them.

Callicratidas, indeed intending to break through the Athenian formation, had arranged his fleet in a single line. The master of his ship, Hermon the Megarian, noting the Athenian fleet outnumbered them, advised Callicratidas to withdraw. "Sparta would fare none the worse if I am killed," the com-

What should have been held up as a crowning victory for the Athenian navy dissolved into public outcry

mander replied, "but flight would be a disgrace." Splitting his fleet in two to avoid being flanked, he led the right in a direct attack. Among the first ships to close on the enemy fleet, Callicratidas' flagship targeted Pericles' trireme for ramming. The impact, however, tossed the hapless Spartan commander overboard to be swallowed up in the waves. The leaderless right collapsed, soon followed by the Spartan left. Seventy Spartan ships and their crews followed their commander to the bottom, while the survivors fled to Chios and other Spartan ports.

A messenger ship made it back to Mytilene and delivered the bad news to Eteonicus. Seeking to quell the hopes of the blockaded Athenians and avoid a panic among his own men, he ordered the crew of the messenger ship to immediately sail for Chios, while he reported a glorious Spartan victory.

Though they lost 25 ships, the Athenians were determined to exploit their victory and smash Eteonicus' blockading fleet. However, a storm came up, thwarting their plans and preventing a smaller fleet under captains Theramenes and Thrasyboulos from recovering Athenian survivors and the dead.

Eteonicus took advantage of the reprieve to break port. After calmly ordering his crews to have dinner, he instructed them to sail to Chios with all speed. Eteonicus himself went ashore, ordered the Spartan camp stricken and burned, and led the infantry back to the waiting galleys in Methymna. Conon fell for the ploy. When he finally did emerge with his ships, he found only Athenian galleys sailing to his aid.


The naval battle off the Arginusae had pitted nearly 300 ships and some 60,000 marines against one another in rough seas. But what should have been held up as a crowning victory for the Athenian navy dissolved into public outcry when citizens learned of the failed recovery of some 4,000 crewmen from the 25 lost triremes.

In no mood to celebrate, the Athenians instead deposed all the generals but Conon. Forewarned of the ill winds blowing from Athens, Protomachus and Aristogenes stayed away from the capital. The other six—Aristocrates, Diomedon, Erasinides, Lysias, Pericles and Thrasyllus—returned home to a storm of official censure. First to face the music was Erasinides, who was charged with misconduct. When a court threw him in prison, the other generals made a statement before the Senate, outlining the course of the battle and explaining the severity of the storm off the Arginusae. Unconvinced, the senators also ordered them imprisoned and turned over to the Assembly for trial.

At the trial Theramenes—co-captain of the fleet that had failed to recover the crews of the stricken galleys—appeared as the main accuser, seeking to deflect attention from himself and instead finger the generals. Boldly accusing them of failing to take responsibility, he presented a letter they had written to the Senate and Assembly in which they fixed blame on the storm alone. Though denied a full hearing as prescribed by law, the generals spoke briefly and persuasively in their own defense. Despite the charge levied by Theramenes, they refused to blame him or his co-captain Thrasybulus, but reiterated their claim the storm alone had thwarted recovery efforts. Other captains and crewmen echoed their claims, testifying to the severity of the storm.

The generals were on the verge of convincing the Assembly of their innocence when nature intervened. Dusk had fallen, and as it would have been impossible to count hands, the assemblymen agreed to postpone the decision for another day. They further agreed to have the Senate draft a proposal on how to decide the generals' fate.

In the meantime Athenians celebrated the annual Apaturia, a three-day Ionian festival during which clans came together to feast, worship, discuss general affairs and register newborns. Theramenes and supporters took advantage of the gathering to persuade kinsmen to appear before the Senate in mourning clothes, claiming to be relatives of the missing, and they bribed Senator Callixeinus to draft a proposal favorable to their desired outcome. Callixeinus resolved to poll the tribes, presenting each with two urns—one to collect votes to convict, the other votes to acquit. Further stacking the deck,





After helping to regain Athenian control of the Aegean, the formerly disgraced Alcibiades returned in triumph to Athens, top, in 407 BC. A year later he again fell from favor after his command failure at Notium. Accounts of his 404 BC death are sketchy but center on assassination.

the accusers brought forward a man who claimed to have survived the battle by floating atop a flour barrel. The man insisted his drowning countrymen had begged him to bring charges against the generals who had left them to die.

Bucking the push to convict, Euryptolemos, an assemblyman and member of a leading Athenian family, questioned the constitutionality of Callixeinus' proposal—namely to judge the generals together, instead of separately. Others supported his motion, but they backed down when the mob gathered to witness the proceeding shouted down the dissenters and threatened to judge them in a similar vote.

When still other assemblymen refused to put the proposal to a vote, Callixeinus took the floor to repeat his charge, and the mob called for the impeachment of anyone who objected. Only then did the cowed assemblymen agree to put it to a vote. Socrates, the sole dissenter, declared he would do only what the law provided for and not what the mob required. Euryptolemos then rose once more to make a long and impassioned plea on behalf of the generals for a full, fair and above all constitutional defense.

Following his oration he countered Callixeinus' proposal with a resolution to try the generals separately. The assemblymen voted to adopt Euryptolemos' proposal. But on a technical objection they called for a second vote, which adopted Callixeinus' proposal to judge them together. When the urns were collected and the tribal votes tallied, the Assembly found the scapegoat generals guilty, confiscated their property and condemned the six to death.

As they were about to be led off to public execution, Diomedon took the floor amid resounding silence to address the Assembly and onlookers: "Men of Athens, may the decision taken concerning us turn out auspiciously for the city. Regarding the vows we made for victory: Since Fortune has prevented our discharging them—and it would be well that you give thought to them—pay them to Zeus the Savior and Apollo and the Furies, since it was to them we made our vows before we won our victory at sea."

Thus did Athenians reverse the result of their generals' victory off the Arginusae. For while their demoralized fleet passed largely into the hands of lesser commanders, Spartans broke with convention to rename Lysander as their admiral. In 405 BC he finally and utterly destroyed the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami on the Hellespont, forever changing the balance of power in Greece.

The regretful Athenians later denounced those who had instigated the proceedings against the condemned generals, imprisoning Callixeinus and four others. But following the loss at Aegospotami and a subsequent insurrection, the five hated men escaped. Years later Callixeinus returned to Athens, but no one would speak to him, let alone bother with a retrial. Alone and forgotten, he died of starvation. MH

Thomas Zacharis is based in Thessaloniki, Greece. For further reading he recommends The History of the Peloponnesian War, by Thucydides, and Hellenica, by Xenophon.



Men of War: The American Soldier in Combat at Bunker Hill, Gettysburg and Iwo Jima, by Alexander Rose, Random House, New York, 2015, \$18

ETTYSBURG

A Soldier's Life

Much of the discussion in conventional military literature focuses on high-level strategy, tactics and leadership. Consequently, military historians often bypass the day-to-day experience of frontline combat soldiers. In *Men of War* Rose examines the lives of such soldiers through the unflinching prism of the Battles of Bunker Hill, Gettysburg and Iwo Jima. Through the use of eyewitness accounts and letters Rose constructs a frank and graphic account of everyday life in combat situations.

The author notes that soldiers not only see, feel and hear battle, but also perceive and interpret it differently depending on their respective personalities, culture and era. Along the way he reveals combat in its varied moods—exhilarating, horrifying, boring, terrifying, barbaric, noble, random, tragic and farcical.

Rose draws thought-provoking parallels between soldiers' experiences across the different wars, noting that in all three battles they managed to adapt their tactics to defeat professional enemy forces that either outnumbered or outmaneuvered them. He eloquently explains the gradual hardening of soldiers' emotions to unthinkable sights, which enabled them to develop emotional indifference and maintain combat readiness. *Men of War* also investi-

gates how soldiers dealt with shifting attitudes about war over the course of two centuries.

Rose's unsparing account of the experience of frontline soldiers is a compelling reminder of the human cost of war and the scars that linger when the firing stops. It also serves as a warning that, given the consequent toll on people, infrastructure and societies, the decision to enter war should never be made lightly.

-S.L. Hoffman

Mercenaries to Conquerors: Norman Warfare in the 11thand 12th-Century Mediterranean, by Paul Brown, Pen & Sword, Barnsley, U.K., 2016, \$39.95

In Mercenaries to Conquerors Brown, an independent scholar and author of numerous essays on Byzantine history, investigates the role the Normans played during two centuries of conflict in the southeastern Mediterranean Sea. Southern Italy had remained under Greek control, both militarily and religiously, since 740, when Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Emperor Leo III transferred Calabria and Apulia from the jurisdiction of the Roman papacy to the patriarch of Constantinople. That sparked an ongoing conflict between the old and new Rome, which went from insurgency to open warfare. In the early 11th century the Normans, who had first arrived in Italy as pilgrims, began selling their services as warriors. In 1018, for example, some 300 Normans led by Gilbert Buatère took part in a Lombard insurrection led by Melus of Bari that met disaster at the hands of the eminent Greek general Basil Boioannes at Cannae, only seven of the Normans surviving. Twenty years later, however, Byzantine General George Maniakes began his campaign to drive the Arabs from Sicily with an army that included a Norman contingent under Guillaume de Hauteville.

In spite of notable successes the Byzantine efforts ultimately were in

vain, but in the process the Normans, ensconced in the region, began a remarkable campaign to carve out an empire of their own. By 1071 the Byzantines had permanently lost southern Italy, and problems arose in mainland Greece. Characteristically exploiting the situation, the Normans for a time seized control of such cities as Corinth, Thebes and Thessaloniki. Succeeding where Maniakes failed, the Normans restored Christianity to Sicily and during the First Crusade Bohemond I, son of the powerful Duke Robert Guiscard of Apulia and Calabria, displayed exceptional gifts as both warlord and diplomat to play a leading role in securing Antioch and Jerusalem.

Although best known to Westerners for taking over England under William the Conqueror, the Normans deserve more attention for their equally remarkable feats in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Brown's important book brings this to light in a way that will satisfy all historians interested in the Byzantine era as well as medieval warfare.


-Thomas Zacharis

Brothers at Arms: American Independence and the Men of France and Spain Who Saved It, by Larrie D. Ferreiro, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2016, \$30

This well-written book seeks to demythologize the American Revolutionary War by framing it in an international context. Rather than being a rebellion won by plucky minutemen at Concord or guerrillas following Francis "The Swamp Fox" Marion through the Carolinas, Ferreiro argues the war was in fact a game of global geopolitics played by Europe's great powers—England, France and Spain. While the United States (or what the French called the United American Provinces) played a part in that game, events as far away as Brazil, India, and Central Europe all helped determine the fate of the upstart colonists.

Most Americans know the French sent the colonists a fleet under Lt. Gen. François-Joseph-Paul de Grasse and a force of 7,000 men under Jean-Baptiste-Donatien de Vimeur, Comte de Rochambeau, sealing the British defeat at Yorktown. Ferreiro shows the relationship went much deeper and began much earlier. Although neither France nor Spain appear by

name in the text of the Declaration of Independence, Ferreiro argues its chief intended audiences were the royal courts of Paris and Madrid. By declaring openly for independence, the Americans were pleading for help and demonstrating they were prepared



to fight to the finish, hopefully proving to the French and Spanish the new nation would make a good strategic investment. Thomas Paine had already made the case for French and Spanish alliances in his pamphlet *Common Sense*, published earlier in 1776.


For their part the French and Spanish were less concerned about helping the plucky Americans than they were in improving their geopolitical position and exacting a measure of revenge against the British for the Seven Years' War, a conflict that propelled British power worldwide. While helping the Americans break away from their imperial masters might not wholly right the score, it would certainly help. The French especially began to loan money, negotiate favorable trade deals and provide materiel support.

As with many such alliances, each side mistrusted the other. John Adams in particular considered aristocratic France an unstable and unreliable ally. Still, Ferreiro reveals the global dimensions of British, French and Spanish strategy in the period, consciously exploding what he deems America's "myth of heroic self-sufficiency."

-Michael S. Neiberg


Reviews

RECOMMENDED



His Father's Son, by Tim Brady

Theodore Roosevelt Jr. struggled to escape the shadow of his father, the president. This biography spans the younger Roosevelt's World War I service through a lackluster political career to his re-enlistment in World War II. The oldest soldier on D-Day, he proved himself on Utah Beach and earned the Medal of Honor.



The Leper Spy, by Ben Montgomery


Josefina "Joey" Guerrero, a Filipina leper, used her greatest weakness to succeed as a World War II spy. Japanese soldiers she encountered were too horrified to search her, allowing her to smuggle maps to Douglas MacArthur, track troop movements and bandage wounded soldiers, eventually earning a Medal of Freedom.

Hero of the Empire: The Boer War, a Daring Escape and the Making of Winston Churchill, by Candice Millard, Doubleday, New York, 2016, \$30

Winston Churchill had already distinguished himself during the 1897 Malakand campaign on India's North-West Frontier and in the 1898 charge of the 17th Lancers at Omdurman. When the British launched their war against South Africa's Boer settlers in 1899, Churchill approached The Morning Post and at 24 became the highest paid war correspondent in Britain. He clearly planned to live the high life, as his luggage for the voyage south included a dazzling array of wines and spirits worth \$4,000 in today's currency.

In this biography, subtitled in part The Making of Winston Churchill, Millard. author of the best-selling River of Doubt, relates the epic story of Churchill's capture just two weeks after arriving in South Africa and his subsequent escape. Anxious to reach Ladysmith, Churchill grasped the opportunity to travel on an armored train, the benefits of which were dubious in the extreme, later describing it as "a locomotive disguised as a knight errant." Commanding the train was Aylmer Haldane, an old friend from his days with the Tirah Field Force on the North-West Frontier.

His doubts were justified, as Boer commandos derailed part of the train and then sur-



rounded it on three sides. For over an hour under continual fire Churchill directed efforts to clear the line so the locomotive and what was left of the train could escape. Churchill himself was among the more than 50 men captured by the Boers.

Barely three weeks later he again escaped, making an epic 300-mile journey by several trains to Portuguese East Africa. At one point he hid in a clump of trees under the scrutiny of a vulture "who manifested an extravagant interest in my condition," and he also spent three days concealed in a coal mine. After 11 days on the run Churchill finally reached Durban, soon becoming an international celebrity.

He later recalled the saga in his autobiography *My Early Life*: "Youth seeks adventure. Journalism requires advertisement. Certainly I had found both. I became for the time quite famous." He certainly had. A well-known story, perhaps, but always worth another read, and here quite brilliantly told.

—David Saunders


Waging War: The Clash Between Presidents and Congress, 1776 to ISIS, by David J. Barron, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2016, \$30

U.S. Circuit Court Judge Barron is a recent former Department of Justice official who wrote a controversial legal memo justifying drone strikes against American citizens, specifically radical Islamic terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen, without judicial process. Ironically, drone strikes are a presidential military action not specifically mentioned in this book, a reworked, less-partisan treatment of two lengthy academic articles Barron co-authored that were critical of the George W. Bush administration's use of force.

Barron's primary argument is that U.S. presidents have operated under congressional restrictions, finding ways to cope or work around them. Neither branch of government has overwhelmed the other but continue an unresolved power struggle subject to an enduring system of checks and balances. He chronicles the evolving relationship of the commander in chieffrom George Washington to Barack Obama—with the legislative branch (Congress), in charge of oversight and funding, and the judicial branch (Supreme Court), as a counter to questionable executive actions.

The first example he provides is debate over whether

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
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Reviews

RECOMMENDED



An Iron Wind, by Peter Fritzsche

The destruction and carnage of World War II, far more so than II, far more so than those of World War I, reached beyond the front to civilians in occupied Europe. Drawing on first-person accounts, Fritzsche explains how people struggled to make sense of the horrors of war while ironically remaining indifferent to their neighbors' fates.



The Swamp Fox, by John Ollere

Fictionalized in a 1959–61 Disney miniseries and as the title character in the 2000 film *The Patriot*, Francis "The Swamp Fox" Marion was a famed Continental Army officer who used guerrilla tactics in the southern theater of the American Revolutionary War to sap British resources and boost Patriot morale.


to destroy New York City in 1776 rather than let it fall to the British, something Washington unsuccessfully urged Congress to approve and for which he was unwilling to take sole responsibility. Other incidents illustrate fears of a potential "man on horseback" resisting presidential command authority, congressional overreach and presidential excess, epitomized, respectively, by General Andrew Jackson's illegal imposition of martial law in New Orleans in 1815, Andrew Johnson's 1868 impeachment in the context of Reconstruction, and Bush's plans for preemptive strikes on potential enemies after the 9/11 attacks.

Unfortunately, Barron fails to mention many other illustrative examples, including Thomas Jefferson's war against Barbary pirates, James Monroe's seizure of Florida, Woodrow Wilson's incursions into Mexico, Harry S. Truman's removal of Douglas MacArthur from Korea, John Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs, and the aforementioned drone strikes, a hallmark of Obama's military action. Waging War is thus an accessible albeit incomplete reference.

-William John Shepherd

The Fleet at Flood Tide: America at Total War in the Pacific, 1944–45, by James D. Hornfischer, Bantam Books, New York, 2016, \$35

"For they sow the wind and reap the whirlwind," begins



Verse 7 from Chapter 8 of the Old Testament Book of Hosea. According to author Hornfischer, the Japanese sowed the wind at Pearl Harbor, and it was during the U.S. campaign to capture the Marianas in 1944 they finally began to reap the whirlwind. The author makes the case the United States halted the Japanese advance at the Battle of Midway, while the Guadalcanal campaign had been a battle of attrition in which the Americans eventually prevailed. However, as Hornfischer explains in this fascinating new book, the U.S. had fought those campaigns with prewar assets that had survived the debacles at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. It was in the 1944 campaign in the Central Pacific the United States finally unleashed a new generation of warships, aircraft and troop formations, risen phoenixlike from the ashes.

In December 1941 a seemingly unstoppable Japanese war machine had stormed eastward across the Pacific, overwhelming everything in its path. From the outset

of 1944, however, U.S. military power began to overwhelm the Japanese.

The period of 1944–45 represented the zenith of American military power. Yet in a sense the title is somewhat misleading, because The Fleet at Flood Tide is not concerned solely with the "fleet," but also with the Marines, Army, Army Air Forces and even the development of the atomic bomb. The conquest of the Marianas was a combined Navy/ Marines/Army operation, and once captured, the islands were transformed into bases from which the Twentieth Air Force launched its devastating strategic bombing offensive against the Japanese Home Islands. One of those islands became the launching site from which the atomic bombs were deployed, an act the author cites as the principal factor in Emperor Hirohito's decision to accept the Allies' surrender terms.

Hornfischer's narrative reads like an epic novel in which a number of seemingly disparate narratives and characters are interwoven to form a single complex story line that all comes together in the end. It is a welcome addition to the author's previous books on the Pacific War. While primarily centered on the Marianas and Palau Islands campaign, The Fleet at Flood Tide presents a comprehensive and highly readable history of the closing year and a half of the Pacific War.

-Robert Guttman



- Mao Zedong
- Fidel Castro
- John Lennon
- Elvis Presley

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MAGAZINES/QUIZ

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ANSWER: ELVIS PRESLEY, PRESLEY WROTE MIXON A LETTER REQUESTING A VISIT. AT THE MEETING PRESLEY SUGGESTED THAT HE BE MADE A "FEDERAL AGENT AT LARGE" IN THE BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS.

Hallowed Ground Moores Creek National Battlefield

By William John Shepherd

t the outset of the American Revolution, nearly a century before the Civil War, North Carolina was riven with strife between independence-minded Patriots and Loyalists to the British Crown. Rebellious local legislators and their militia companies ultimately took up arms against the latter, led by beleaguered Royal Governor Josiah Martin.

In June 1775, after Patriots discovered the governor's plot to instigate a slave rebellion, Martin fled to dilapidated Fort Johnson on Cape Fear, seeking refuge on a Royal Navy ship when Patriots burned the fort. Martin assured British officials he could restore royal authority by arming recent emigrants from the Scottish Highlands. Meanwhile, the British planned to send a fleet to the Carolinas with some 2,000 troops under Maj. Gen. Henry Clinton. In January 1776 several hundred Highlander settlers from the Carolinas mustered at Cross Creek (present-day Fayetteville), where Scots veterans Brig. Gen. Donald MacDonald and Lt. Col. Donald McLeod were recruiting for the British army. Martin decided to unite the interior Highlanders and prewar rebels known as Regulators with those slated to arrive on the coast.

Patriot reaction was swift. The Continental Congress put Colonel James Moore in command of the 1st North Carolina Regiment, tasked with the defense of Cape Fear. Moore promptly banded together with militia units from Wilmington under Alexander Lillington and New Bern under Richard Caswell, supported by men from neighboring counties.

In mid-February MacDonald led 1,600 Loyalists toward Wilmington. Learning that Moore, with about 1,000 well-armed Patriots, fortified the bridge over Rockfish Creek, he decided to take an alternate route to the coast. In anticipation of his opponent's move Moore blocked all key river crossings. Word of the Patriot response prompted scores of Loyalists to desert. As MacDonald and his 1,000 remaining men approached Corbett's Ferry on the Black River on February 23, they found Caswell's militia waiting. Learning of a crossing upstream, MacDonald kept his men on the march. Caswell learned of the move and fast-marched his 800 men to join Lillington's 150 militiamen at the bridge on Widow Moore's Creek, a waterway about 50 feet wide

and 5 feet deep that flowed into the Black River 20 miles north of Wilmington.

Arriving at the span, the elderly MacDonald unsuccessfully urged Caswell to surrender. The colonel didn't favor attack, as his Highlanders, who largely lacked firearms, faced a frontal bridgehead assault, but his more aggressive officers prevailed. The next day, February 27, with bagpipes playing, McLeod and Captain John Campbell led the dawn attack.

In preparation Patriots had removed sections of bridge planking and greased the girders. Heedless, McLeod and Campbell led the Highlanders across the slippery span into a whistling storm of musket and small cannon fire. Both officers and some 30 Highlanders fell dead, either struck before they could cross or shot from the bridge into the water. Aghast, their fellows broke and ran. Patriot casualties were light—two wounded, John Grady of Duplin County mortally.

Captured in the aftermath, the sickly MacDonald tendered his sword to Moore, who gallantly returned it. The Patriots also rounded up most of his men, nearly 850 of whom were promptly paroled, though MacDonald and some 30 of his officers were sent to Philadelphia as prisoners.

Meanwhile, Martin, from his floating headquarters, continued to press for the forceful return of royal authority. Moore, however, moved his regulars into Wilmington, and by the time the British fleet arrived in mid-March, there was no effective Loyalist base in North Carolina. General Clinton instead targeted Charleston, S.C., where he too suffered a humiliating defeat. The subsequent decline of British authority in the Carolinas eased fears of a slave uprising, as many Loyalists sought refuge in British-occupied New York.

Though small in scale, the clash on Widow Moore's Creek prompted North Carolina's colonial delegates to be the first to call for independence, on April 12, 1776. Patriots throughout the colonies also celebrated it as one of first victories won by American forces, three weeks before George Washington drove the British from Boston. The visitor center at Moores Creek National Battlefield [nps.gov/mocr] relates the story of the fight, while the onsite Patriot Monument marks the grave of John Grady, the sole Patriot slain in the battle. The disposition of the Loyalist dead is unknown. MH



War Games



Conquistadores

Match the following Spanish adventurers to the regions in which each made his mark.

- 1. Pedro de Mendoza
- 2. Francisco de Orellana
- 3. Miguel López de Legazpi
- 4. Francisco Pizarro
- 5. Vasco Núñez de Balboa
- 6. Juan de Oñate
- 7. Juan Ponce de Léon
- 8. Francisco Vázquez de Coronado
- 9. Diego de Almagro
- 10. Hernando de Soto
- ____A. Panama
 ____B. Peru
 ___C. Río de la Plata, Argentina
 ____D. Mississippi River
 ___E. Chile
 ____F. American Southwest
 ____G. Philippines
 ____H. New Mexico
 ____I. Amazon River
 ____J. Florida

Yusmers: A5, B4, C1, D10, E9, F8, G3, H6, 12, J7





In Black and White

Henry Johnson (see P. 12) was not the only black serviceman with a stellar record in World War I.

- 1. In which 1914 battle did a mainly African force rout an invasion force eight times its number?
 - A. Tanga
- B. The Marne
- **C.** The Yser **D.** Charleroi
- 2. Of 47 battalions of Senegalese **Tirailleurs serving on the Western** Front, how many received unitwide Croix de guerre?
 - A. Two
- B. Four
- C. Six
- D. Eight
- 3. Who was the first black combat pilot credited with a confirmed aerial victory?
 - A. Ahmet Ali Celikten
 - B. William Robinson Clarke
 - C. Pierre Réjon
 - D. Eugene Jacques Bullard
- 4. What distinguished Napoleon Bonaparte Marshall in 1918?
 - A. Medal of Honor recipient
 - **B.** Captain, company commander
 - C. Pilot, U.S. Army Air Service
 - **D.** First U.S. Army officer over the Rhine
- 5. Who was the first black American awarded the Medal of Honor in World War I-73 years after his death in action?
 - A. Needham Roberts
 - **B.** Ralph Hawkins
 - C. Freddie Stowers
 - D. Herbert Taylor

Answers: A, D, C, B, C

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